Modeling airline group passenger demand for revenue optimization by Svrcek, Tom
ARCHIVES
FLIGHT TRANSPORTATION LABORATORY
REPORT R91-5
MODELING AIRLINE GROUP
PASSENGER DEMAND FOR
REVENUE OPTIMIZATION
Tom Svrcek
May 1991
2
MODELING AIRLINE GROUP PASSENGER DEMAND
FOR REVENUE OPTIMIZATION
by
TOM SVRCEK
Submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering
on May 10, 1991 in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Operations Research
ABSTRACT
Many airlines currently use a variety of analytic techniques for seat inventory
control as part of a larger revenue or "yield" management system. However, much of the
this effort has emphasized decisions based on the individual passenger, and has
neglected a significant segment of total airline passenger demand, namely that of group
passengers. Group passenger demand differs in several important respects from
individual passenger demand, and these differences have motivated the need for separate
attention in booking procedures and future demand forecasting.
In this thesis we begin by discussing the issues involved with trying to
characterize the stochastic nature of airline group passenger demand, and identify the
primary elements of variability associated with it. Later, we use these primary elements
of demand to develop a mathematical model for the distribution of group passengers on a
given flight(s). Armed with a well-defined distribution for group passenger demand, we
enhance current mathematical programming approaches for solving the seat inventory
control problem to include the control of group seat inventories. We then present a model
for determining the minimum per passenger fare an airline should charge an ad hoc group
request based on the displacement of individual passengers. Finally, we discuss the
issues involved with overbooking in the group demand context, and suggest areas for
further research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation for Thesis
The competitive nature of today's commercial airline industry has motivated the
development of a variety of quantitative techniques aimed at increasing revenues and/or
reducing costs. One such group of techniques, known as seat inventory control or
revenue/yield management, has been the focus of much recent research. Since the
deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, the elimination of a fixed fare structure by
the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board and the resulting increased competition brought
about the need for new strategies to maximize revenue under an aggressive open market
consisting of many new upstart, low-cost carriers. These carriers were given the
opportunity to serve routes previously restricted to the large, major carriers, and due to
low cost structures they could charge lower fares than were offered previously. The large
major carriers that once enjoyed the benefits of fixed pricing and essentially no
competition had to compete aggressively for passenger demand. Recognizing that the
marginal cost of carrying an additional passenger on a flight is rather small, the airlines
realized they could sell a number of seats at discounted prices in order to stimulate
otherwise dormant, price sensitive demand, and in doing so they could increase the total
revenue for the flight. This practice is known as differential pricing.
The concept of differential pricing is straightforward -- more "valuable" variations
of a similar product (those providing higher utility to the consumer) are offered at higher
prices. The difficulty with applying the notion of differential pricing to the air
transportation industry is that the product itself is rather homogeneous -- travel between
a specified origin and destination. The idea of varying utility, then, had to come not from
the travel itself but rather the flexibility with which one can purchase that travel. The
airlines thus created distinct fare "products", placing varying degrees of restrictions on
each product, affecting its utility to the consumer. The more deeply discounted the fare
product, the more severe were the restrictions made on its purchase.
A good example of a common restriction placed on deeply discounted fares is the
advance purchase deadline -- typically 7 or 14 days prior to the date of departure. The
advance purchase restriction is generally inconvenient for the business traveler, who often
cannot plan his trip very far in advance. Thus, the business traveler must purchase a
more expensive, less restricted fare product -- one which allows him to book his ticket up
to the time of departure. By creating effective barriers which prohibit high fare customers
from purchasing lower fare products, the airlines can dramatically increase total revenue
on each flight, without allowing the high fare customers to purchase the lower priced fare
products.
While the benefits of a differential price structure are obvious to the passenger
qualified to purchase the deeply discounted fare products, there are, in theory, benefits for
passengers who must purchase the higher priced fare products as well. The incremental
revenue generated by the price-sensitive traveler keeps the average ticket price down for
all passengers, as the burden of covering the operating costs of the flight is now spread
over more passengers.
The practical difficulty with differential pricing is that the new, price-sensitive
demand can exceed the number of seats that would otherwise go empty on a given flight,
raising the possibility of low revenue passengers displacing the higher revenue
passengers. Thus, the airlines developed a technique to limit the number of seats
available at each of the different fare product levels, in order to maximize the expected
revenue for a given flight. This technique, known as seat inventory control, strives to
achieve the delicate balance between minimizing the number of empty seats on a given
flight and minimizing the displacement of high revenue passengers by low revenue
passengers.
Most of the recent work done in the area of seat inventory control has
concentrated on decisions regarding the marginal individual passenger, i.e. the number of
seats allocated to a particular fare class is a function of the forecasted demand of
individual passenger bookings and the revenue each individual passenger will generate in
a particular fare class. However, there exists another source of bookings which can
constitute a significant portion of total passenger demand, particularly in markets
dominated by international and leisure travel. These markets are typically characterized
by a considerable number of group passenger bookings -- bookings made in large blocks at
once by a third party (such as a tour operator or travel agent), rather than by the
individuals themselves.
Although groups can be treated, in many cases, as simply a collection of
individuals, there exist important differences that warrant separate attention in the
context of seat inventory control. For example, in accepting a group request, the airline at
once reduces the uncertainty of future demand by the size of the group, rather than by a
single individual. This reduction in uncertainty is valuable to the airline, in essentially the
same way the certainty of bulk orders is valuable to most suppliers. Recognizing the
value of their request to the airlines, travel agents and tour operators will generally
negotiate for a lower fare per group passenger than the comparable individual passenger
fare. There exists, then, the potential of displacing higher revenue passengers with the
lower revenue group passengers and thus reducing the total revenue for that flight. The
revenue lost in displacing higher revenue passengers could eliminate any advantage
initially gained by accepting the group at the negotiated fare.
Moreover, simply booking a group request does not guarantee revenue for an
airline. There still exists a distinct possibility that all or part of the initial block of seats
requested will ultimately not be purchased and/or used. To complicate matters further,
tour operators may book the same group on several carriers in the process of searching for
the best group fare quote. The unused seats from a returned group request may be absent
from the carrier's seat inventory for months, and the revenue lost due to their absence
may not be recovered in the (possibly short) period of time the seats are once again made
available. An intuitive solution to this problem might be to introduce non-refundable
deposits or cancellation penalties on seats requested by a travel agent or tour operator.
However, the threat of lost goodwill and the number of other competitors able to fulfill any
request has generally limited the effectiveness of any such penalty scheme in practice.
Another solution might be for the carrier to accept more group passenger bookings
on a flight than the available capacity, fully anticipating that some groups will cancel prior
to departure. The airline group analyst, then, must carefully weigh the costs of having a
flight depart with a large block of empty seats versus the cost of possibly denying
boarding to many group passengers at once when accepting or rejecting a group request.
Any effective group overbooking policy would have to consider this "multiplier effect" of
many passengers being affected by a single accept/reject decision.
The above discussion suggests a need for characterizing the nature of group
demand independent of individual passenger demand. Moreover, it motivates the need for
separate consideration of group demand on the part of the airline when making seat
allocation and overbooking decisions. Indeed, errors in accepting or rejecting a single
large group may mean the difference between a profitable and an unprofitable flight.
1.2 Goal of Thesis
Increasingly sophisticated models are currently being developed to control seat
inventories. An integral part of the input to these models are the forecasts associated
with future passenger demand. In order to incorporate the idea of group bookings as a
source of future passenger demand, we must develop a means to model the nature of the
group booking process. One major objective of this thesis to provide the necessary
framework to develop a mathematical model to characterize group demand for a given
flight itinerary.
In order to achieve this goal, we must first explore the group booking process
qualitatively, so that we may better understand the differences between group and
individual passenger demand. In our comparison, we will discuss such issues as
overbooking, cancellation and no-show rates, even sell-up, and show how each of these
issues can be modified to fit the group booking context. Later, we use this information to
construct our mathematical model of group demand itself.
Our mathematical characterization begins by presenting a general formulation for
the distribution of the number of group passengers expected for a particular flight itinerary.
The model we present is a probabilistic formulation based on a random sum of two random
variables. We then add the dimension of variability associated with group cancellation
and no-show rates, in order to provide a more realistic model of group passenger demand.
Armed with a model for the distribution of group passenger demand, we then
demonstrate how to incorporate our model into current formulations designed to solve the
seat inventory control problem. More specifically, we present explicit formulations for
both the single leg and multi-leg, multi-class (MLMC) problems, in order to demonstrate
how to implement the group model into current practices.
It is not the intent of this thesis to provide an exhaustive set of empirical results to
be used in comparing one inventory control technique with another in hopes of
establishing a 'best' method. The empirical results included in this thesis are meant to
serve two purposes. First, they are intended 'to show that the theoretical constructs
presented are rather simple to implement in practice, and they are provided as a guide to
this end. Second, they are meant to serve as incentives to implement these models and
draw more relevant, case-specific conclusions as to which method will work best under a
variety of circumstances.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized in six chapters, each addressing a
separate issue of the group booking control problem. Chapter 2 introduces the seat
inventory control problem. We begin by discussing the single leg problem, and work
toward the more complex multi-class, multi-leg problem. Along with a general
description, we introduce a simple network which we will use as the foundation for our
explicit formulations of optimization methods to solve the problem. Next, we discuss the
difficulties associated with actually implementing the solutions in a real world
environment. We then differentiate between two types of problem solving techniques,
known as planning models and decision making models, and discuss the differences
between them. Finally, we describe and state the necessary assumptions behind each of
the different problem formulations, and clarify what is meant by the word "optimal" when
discussing problem solutions. We define the set of assumptions used when formulating
the seat inventory control problem as the specific "problem environment", which, like the
problem formulation, can be either deterministic or probabilistic.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the current body of literature on the seat inventory
problem, and discuss further, through examples, the differences between planning and
decision making models for solving the problem. We also introduce a hybrid method,
which utilizes advantages from two distinct approaches to the inventory control problem,
in order to solve the problem in yet another "optimal" way.
Chapter 4 discusses, at length, the group booking process, and introduces crucial
distinctions between group and individual passenger booking procedures. We describe a
typical group booking scenario, including a discussion of the negotiation phase, which
does not ordinarily take place in the context of individual passenger travel. We also
discuss modified notions of overbooking, cancellation rates, and sell-up as they pertain to
the group booking process. Also in the chapter, we discuss the major sources of variation
associated with group travel demand, namely the number of group requests, the size of
each individual group request, and the utilization rates associated with a group request.
The remainder of Chapter 4 involves the development of the mathematical model for the
distribution of group passenger demand for a particular flight itinerary. We also discuss
specific implementation issues pertinent to using our model, including simplifying
assumptions which can be made to aid the ease of use.
Following the development of the model for group demand, we present in Chapter
5 specific formulations for both the single leg and MLMC seat inventory control problems.
These formulations are extensions of previously developed models, modified to take into
consideration the group demand model developed in Chapter 4. We consider, in each of
our formulations of the planning model approach, the possibility of both deterministic and
probabilistic demand. We then present the Displacement Cost Model for negotiating ad
hoc group requests, both from a leg-based and a network based perspective. Included in
our discussion of the Displacement Cost Model is a simple numerical example in order to
address implementation issues. Finally, we discuss the practice of overbooking in the
group passenger context. Although we do not present an explicit model for overbooking
group passenger demand, we discuss the important issues related to developing such a
model.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the findings of the thesis, and we suggest
directions for further research. Since the area of group passenger seat inventory control is
relatively new, there are many such opportunities which can have dramatic revenue
impacts for even small sized carriers.
Chapter 2
Seat Inventory Control
2.1 The Problem Defined
Consider the problem of allocating seats to several different fare classes on a
single leg flight, where all passenger itineraries are restricted to one origin-destination
pair. The solution as to how many seats to allocate to each fare class depends almost
exclusively on the average revenue associated with each fare class and the corresponding
forecasted demand. The intuitive solution suggests that we begin by allocating as many
seats as there exists demand for the high revenue passengers, and continue to allocate
the remaining seats successively in a "top down" fashion to the lower revenue
passengers. We assume that the necessary fare restrictions are in place so that higher
revenue passengers are not able to purchase tickets in the lower fare classes.
Extending the above case to multiple leg flights is non-trivial. In the multiple flight
leg case, we must account for differences in the revenues associated with accepting a
booking request from a passenger travelling on only one leg and a passenger traversing
both legs of a two-leg flight. In addition, we must consider these revenue differences
among each of the different fare classes offered. This problem is referred to as the
multiple leg, multiple class, or MLMC seat inventory control problem. Consider the
simple route network shown in Figure 2.1.
A B C
Figure 2.1: Three Airport Route Network
Passengers can fly any one of three distinct itineraries:
i) A - B non-stop
ii) B - C non-stop
iii) A - C one-stop
Consider the case where there is strong demand for all three itineraries. If we
employ our intuitive single leg methodology to just the A-B leg, the considerable revenue
generated by the A-C passengers relative to the A-B passengers would cause our
greedy intuitive approach to always give preference to A-C itineraries. The "network"
optimal solution, however, might favor the sum of the non-stop revenues generated by A-
B and B-C passengers, whose total revenue is generally higher than for the single one-
stop A-C passenger (in the same booking class). In this instance, for the A-B leg
inventory, our seat inventory control methodology should prohibit excessive A-C
bookings in favor of the non-stop A-B bookings in order to maximize revenues.
Conversely, consider the case where there is little demand in the B-C local
market, but continued strong demand in the A-B and A-C markets. If our seat inventory
control methodology does not differentiate between the A-C and A-B passengers, we run
the risk of filling the A-B leg with local A-B traffic, and subsequently flying the B-C leg
virtually empty due to the absence of the A-C through passengers. Ideally, we would like
to be able to set allocations for each O-D/fare class combination on the flight, in order to
maximize our revenue potential. Network considerations are further complicated if we
expand our simple network as shown in Figure 2.2.
D
A B C
Figure 2.2: Four Airport Route Network
Passengers on the A-B leg may be part of three distinct itineraries now, and we
must consider network revenue contributions of the A-D passengers (who will change
aircraft for the B-D leg) versus the contributions we have discussed previously. The
sophisticated hub and spoke networks operated by today's carriers are several orders of
magnitude more complex than our simple network. In order to achieve system-wide
revenue maximization objectives, many airlines are currently researching methodologies
for controlling seat inventories over multiple leg itineraries, which as we have discussed,
is a more complex problem than simply controlling each leg individually.
2.2 The Realities of Seat Inventory Control
In order to be effective in generating incremental revenues for the airlines, the
theories and methodologies developed for seat inventory control must be implemented
through current computer reservations systems, each with its own set of constraints and
capabilities. Unfortunately, these reservations systems are not standardized, nor do
they currently support real-time updates of input data to the seat inventory control
algorithms after each booking request is received. Therefore, the current practice is for
the seat inventory control system to set booking limits for the reservations system based
on off-line analysis of historical and/or current passenger data, and these limits are
generally updated periodically throughout the booking period for each flight. The
reservations systems maintain the booking limits, and accept or reject booking requests
from passengers based on the established booking limits for each fare class. Some
reservations systems maintain fare class inventories in discrete "buckets" -- each fare
class is allocated a distinct number of seats which are used exclusively for bookings in
that fare class. The difficulty with maintaining seat inventories in this manner is the
potential for refusing a booking request for a high fare passenger while a lower fare
bucket remains open.
Other reservations systems allow for fare class nesting, or sharing of inventories.
Such systems order the fare classes by some measure of revenue/desirability, from
highest to lowest, and allow higher fare classes to share the inventories of classes lower
in value. Instead of non-nested, partitioned fare class allocations, the reservation
system maintains fare class booking limits, where the booking limit is defined as the sum
of the seats available to the class in question and all lower ranked fare classes. Such a
system prevents the refusal of a higher fare booking request while lower fare inventories
are still available. Table 2.1 demonstrates the difference between nested and non-
nested inventory control.
Table 2.1 - Nested vs. Non-Nested Inventory Levels
Fare Non-Nested Nested Booking
Class Allocation Limit
Y 20 120
B 30 100
M 15 70
H 25 55
Q 30 30
In the above example, if the number of bookings for, say, fare class M reaches 15,
in the non-nested environment all further requests for fare class M will be refused
(assuming no cancellations). In the nested system, an M-class request will not be
refused until the total number of bookings for classes Q, H, and M reaches 70. The
remaining 50 seats of the aircraft are similarly being protected for classes Y and B.
In current practice, inventories for most reservations systems are maintained
strictly for each leg, rather than the entire origin-destination path for passengers
traversing multiple legs. In other words, a connecting itinerary BOS-ORD-SFO will be
subject to control separately as one BOS-ORD flight and one ORD-SFO flight. A Y-
class request for BOS-SFO requires availability in both BOS-ORD and ORD-SFO Y-
class inventories, and no distinction is made between a local BOS-ORD Y-class request
and a BOS-ORD-SFO request for the BOS-ORD leg. More advanced systems allow
restricted O-D control for multiple leg flights maintaining the same flight number, thus
exerting separate control for BOS-ORD-SFO and BOS-ORD passengers in the above
example. However, the large hub and spoke networks operated by today's major carriers
create possible multiple leg itineraries over numerous flight numbers. It is believed that
the proper control of individual O-D/fare class itineraries can increase potential revenues
dramatically.
The next three sections are included to familiarize the reader with the different
aspects involved with developing a seat inventory control system. Section 2.3 describes
two distinct problems which an inventory control system can address, either
independently or in tandem. These two types of problems are known as planning models
and decision making models. In Section 2.4, we define what we call "problem
environments", which describe the simplifying assumptions made in order to characterize
each problem mathematically. The more simplified the problem, the easier it is to solve,
but at the expense of the potential usefulness of the results. In Section 2.5, we describe
various problem formulations and solution algorithms used to solve these problems.
Finally in Section 2.6, we discuss the implications of including group booking requests
into any seat inventory control model.
2.3 Planning Models vs. Decision Making Models
We make a distinction here between two similar types of problems which can be
modeled when addressing the seat allocation or seat inventory control problem --
planning and decision making models.
The first type of problem we will discuss is the planning model. Planning models
seek to allocate the remaining seats on an aircraft to the optimal mix of fare classes (or
fare class/itinerary combinations), given the forecasted demand for the remaining
bookings to come in each fare class (or fare class/itinerary combination). Initially, before
the airline receives any bookings for a flight, the solution to the planning model is a best
attempt to allocate the authorized capacity of the aircraft to the anticipated demand in
each fare class (or fare class/itinerary combination), in order to maximize the expected
revenue. If the airline does not update its demand forecasts prior to departure, these
allocations will be maintained throughout the booking period for that flight departure. If,
on the other hand, the demand forecasts are updated periodically as actual passenger
demand is realized, the planning model can be employed iteratively after each demand
update, in order to find the optimal mix of allocations for the remaining available
authorized seats. The airline can thus exploit more credible input information to better
capture actual demand patterns, and potentially increase the revenue on each flight.
The second type of seat inventory control problem is solved by the decision
making model. Whereas the output of the planning model is a set of seat allocations for
each booking class, the output of the decision making model is an "accept" or "reject"
response to a request for the next available seat at a specified ticket price. In essence,
the decision making model evaluates the expected revenue of the next available seat
based on demand forecasts, and accepts the request only if the price offered meets or
exceeds that expected revenue. The decision making model can, in some sense, be
thought of as a "real-time" tool, designed to make yes/no decisions for each individual
request, based on the expected revenue of the next seat to be sold.
The difficulty with such models is that demand forecasts are traditionally
expressed in terms of future "bookings to come". Thus, by accepting a request for a seat,
we by definition alter the distribution of the forecast for the remaining bookings to come
for that fare class. The decision making model, in order to make optimal seat allocation
decisions, would at the extreme require updates of demand forecasts after each request
is accepted. This method is obviously computationally prohibitive given the enormous
number of booking requests received by an airline, though approximations may elicit
perfectly usable results.
The two models are not disjoint, although the time frame over which each is
implemented is often different. The planning model, as mentioned above, is typically
implemented prior to the booking period, as well as after each demand forecast update, if
demand forecasts are indeed updated periodically throughout the booking period. The
decision making model would in theory be implemented as each individual booking
request is received. In theory, then, the planning model converges to the decision making
model as passenger demand forecasts are updated more and more frequently. If
passenger forecasts are updated after each request, then the planning model and the
decision making model are essentially the same. Although grossly unrealistic for
individual passenger requests, the decision making methodology is directly applicable for
group booking requests, as we will discuss later.
2.4 Problem Environments
As discussed earlier, the term "problem environment" is simply a way of
describing the set of assumptions we make about the problem we wish to solve in trying
to characterize it mathematically. Such assumptions include the distributions of demand,
the order in which booking requests are received for different fare classes, and the
relationships of demand between fare classes. The two primary environments we will
discuss are the deterministic environment and the probabilistic environment.
2.4.1 The Deterministic Environment
The assumption of a deterministic environment for the seat inventory control
problem, although somewhat unrealistic, is fundamental to the understanding of more
complex environments involving less restrictive assumptions and perhaps more
accurately depicting the actual booking process. As the name implies, everything in the
deterministic environment is known with certainty. Demand levels for each booking class
are known, and can be forecasted well in advance of the time frame over which demand is
realized. Periodic adjustment of demand forecasts is unnecessary -- if our initial forecast
for the demand of Y-class passengers is 10, we know we will receive exactly 10 bookings
in the Y fare class. Note that in the deterministic environment there is also no need to
make any assumption regarding the relative timing of when passengers book in the
different fare classes. We do, however, make the assumption that bookings between fare
classes are independent. The independence assumption states that the number of
bookings received in one fare class does not in any way influence the number of bookings
received in any other fare class -- an assumption which greatly simplifies the analysis for
our seat inventory control models.
2.4.2 The Probabilistic Environment
The uncertain nature of the true airline booking process suggests that the
deterministic environment may grossly oversimplify the problem in modeling passenger
demand behavior. Indeed, seat inventory control would be quite straightforward if
demand levels were always known with certainty.
A more realistic model which captures the inexact behavior of future passenger
demand, at least in part, is described by the probabilistic environment. In it we recognize
the forecasted demand as being an expected value with some degree of uncertainty.
Indeed, it is unlikely that the realized demand will consistently emerge as identical to the
forecasted value; there will be times when the actual demand will exceed our forecast and
times when it will fall short.
Nevertheless, if we have a model of the distribution of demand rather than simply
an expected value, it is possible when formulating the problem to account for situations
when demand levels are different from our forecasts. We account for such disparities
through the idea of probability distributions and expected marginal revenues, which we
briefly describe in the following section. The theory behind such models is not new, and
credit is given to the original investigators in our review of past research in Chapter 3.
The Expected Marginal Revenue Approach
Quite simply, the expected marginal revenue (EMR) approach captures the
uncertain nature of passenger demand, and evaluates the expected revenue generated by
the next available seat if it were assigned to a particular fare class. To calculate the
EMR, we are given a well-defined probability density for the distribution of demand for
that fare class, which we will call fx(xi) for fare class i.
The first seat assigned to a fare class with any appreciable demand will almost
certainly be sold, and thus the expected revenue generated by that seat (if we allocate it
to that fare class) is equal to the revenue associated with that fare class. The next seat,
however, is theoretically not as likely to be sold, and we may or may not receive the
ticket price if we allocate it to that same fare class. The EMR of the second (nth) seat,
then, can be expressed as the ticket price multiplied by the probability that the demand
will exceed one (n-1) seat(s).
The probability of selling the nth seat is reasonably assumed to be a non-
increasing function in n, and can be expressed as the integral
P(ni) = fx(xo) dxo (2.1)
or simply
P(ni) = 1 - Fx(ni) (2.2)
where ni is the current allocation of fare class i, and Fx(ni) is the cumulative probability
of fx(xi), evaluated at ni. The expected marginal revenue of each additional seat
allocated to fare class i (P(ni) scaled by the average revenue of fare class i) is thus also
a non-increasing function in n.
It follows, then, that each available seat of an aircraft can potentially contribute
one of k (where k is the number of fare classes offered) different expected revenues to
the total flight revenue, depending on which fare class the seat is allocated to. The
expected revenue may be significantly lower than the actual ticket price, reflecting the
uncertainty of actually selling that seat in that fare class. Unlike the deterministic
environment in which the expected revenue of a seat is known to be the revenue of that
fare class (provided sufficient demand), it is not assumed, a priori, that a seat will be sold
once allocated in the probabilistic environment. We do, however, maintain the
independence assumption for demand between fare classes. In the next section, we
describe the problem formulations associated with solving the seat inventory control
problem.
2.5 Mathematical Problem Formulations
Having discussed the two types of problem models and problem environments, we
are ready to describe the mathematical formulations used to solve seat inventory control
problems. Each formulation necessarily depends upon the type of problem to be solved
and the set of underlying assumptions made to solve it. The exhaustive set of all the
combinations of problem types, environments and formulations includes many cases which
are not considered by the airlines either because of they over simplify or over complicate
the problem. Therefore, we discuss in the remainder of this chapter a subset of problems
we believe represents a realistic collection of the cases most useful in solving many seat
inventory control problems.
We begin by discussing leg-based approaches, as most computer reservations
systems maintain flight inventories on a flight leg basis. Since the single leg, partitioned
inventory problem is unrealistically simple, we discuss only the nested case, where seat
inventories among different fare classes can be shared. We then discuss methods to
adapt traditional leg-based approaches to include the "network effects" discussed in
Section 2.1.
Finally, we discuss network-based approaches to the seat inventory control
problem, which are formulated using mathematical programming techniques. These
formulations assume partitioned inventories, as the fully nested, multiple leg, multiple fare
class problem is very difficult formulate, let alone to solve on even dramatically simplified
networks. We can, however, discuss network problems in terms of both the deterministic
and probabilistic environments for partitioned O-D allocations, both of which can be
solved for moderately large networks.
2.5.1 Leg-Based Nested Formulations
Our common sense, intuitive approach to allocating seats on a single flight leg
turns out to be a rather sophisticated problem mathematically when seat inventories are
shared. Due to fare class nesting, the jth seat of an aircraft cannot be classified as
uniquely belonging to the Y-class inventory. It can, in fact, depending on demand
distributions, belong to all fare class inventories, with different, non-zero probabilities of
being sold to each one. Our objective of maximizing revenue is well-defined if we
myopically consider only the current individual flight leg, though this set of booking limits
may not be optimal for the entire network. To account for "network effects", leg-based
revenue values must be altered somehow to reflect total revenue contributions. One
method that allows airlines to partially account for such network effects through
reservations inventory structures is known as virtual nesting.
Virtual Nesting
As the name implies, virtual nesting establishes a fare class hierarchy in artificial,
or "virtual" booking classes, based on some measure of system contribution or value
associated with each specific O-D/fare class combination. Combinations with similar
values are grouped into the same virtual class, and leg-based control is exerted on virtual
classes rather than the original fare classes. One method of ranking different O-D/fare
class combinations is to use the corresponding average revenue dollar values.
Returning to our previous example, say the BOS-ORD-SFO discounted M-class
revenue is higher in dollar value than the BOS-ORD full coach Y-class fare. The two-leg
M-class itinerary would then be put into a virtual class X1, and the single leg Y-class
itinerary might be placed in a lower valued virtual class X2. Booking limits based on total
itinerary revenues would then favor refusing the BOS-ORD Y-class passenger for the
BOS-ORD-SFO M-class passenger in such a version of the the virtual fare class
structure.
There are difficulties with a virtual fare class hierarchy based strictly on total
itinerary dollar values. Consider a situation with strong BOS-ORD and ORD-SFO Y-
class demand, where the sum of the two single leg Y-class revenues exceeds the
revenue contribution of the through M-class itinerary. In this instance, we would prefer
not to favor the virtual class Xi over the virtual class X2.
There are other methods used to create virtual fare class hierarchies which avoid
such "greedy" solutions. By defining fare class values differently, an airline can order its
O-D/fare class combinations in a variety of ways, which can potentially change throughout
the booking process. Thus, in allocating seats to different virtual inventories, we are no
longer restricted to the explicit set of originally designated fare classes. We continue
our discussion of mathematical problem formulations to the seat inventory control
problem by describing mathematical programming approaches.
2.5.2 Mathematical Programming Approaches
Deterministic Formulation
Similar to the description of its environment, the deterministic formulation to the
seat inventory control problem is the more straightforward of the two math programming
approaches. The following section describes the foundation for formulating the
deterministic seat inventory control problem as an integer linear program.
In the deterministic environment, demand levels are known with certainty.
Therefore, the contribution of each seat allocated to a particular fare class will be equal to
the revenue value associated with that fare class, until the number of seats allocated
reaches the demand forecast. Any additional seat allocated in excess of demand will
have no contribution. Thus for each fare class, we can define a decision variable which
represents the optimal (integer) number of seats to allocate. The coefficient for each of
the decision variables used in the objective function is simply the revenue value
associated with that fare class.
The non-trivial constraints for the linear program can be grouped into two sets.
The first set of constraints prevents the number of seats allocated to each fare class from
exceeding the corresponding demand forecast for that fare class. Otherwise, all seats
would be allocated to the fare class with the highest revenue value. The second set of
constraints prevents the total number of seats allocated to all fare classes on a particular
flight leg from exceeding the capacity of the aircraft. A more explicit description of the
deterministic linear programming formulation is provided in Chapter 5.
Probabilistic Formulation
The probabilistic formulation to the seat inventory control problem differs from the
deterministic formulation in that we acknowledge the forecast of demand for a fare class
as being uncertain, and thus the revenue contribution for additional seats allocated to a
fare class is characterized by a non-increasing function.
The decision variables in the seat-by-seat probabilistic formulation differ from
those in the deterministic formulation in that we now have a separate, binary decision
variable for each seat being allocated to each fare class. Thus, the number of decision
variables is increased by a factor equal to the capacity of the aircraft. For example, if
there are four fare classes and 100 seats to allocate, the probabilistic formulation can
have as many as 400 decision variables. Judicious selection of the full set of decision
variables, however, can significantly reduce the actual number used in the formulation.
The coefficients of the decision variables become the expected marginal revenues
(EMR's) associated with allocating each additional seat to a particular fare class. Thus,
the first seat to be allocated to a fare class will have a revenue contribution essentially
equal to the full revenue value, but subsequent seats will have smaller contributions due
to the decreasing likelihood of selling seats in that fare class.
The non-trivial constraints in the probabilistic formulation consist of similar
capacity restrictions, in that the total number of seats allocated cannot exceed the
capacity of the aircraft. However, the set of demand constraints are no longer necessary.
Given that demand forecasts are given in terms of probability distributions, there may
exist a non-zero probability of selling a very large number of seats in a particular fare
class, although the expected marginal revenue associated with such large numbers will
be very low.
2.6 Including Group Passenger Demand
In Chapter 4, we provide a general description of the group booking process, as
well as a discussion of differences between individual and group passenger demand
behavior. From the discussions of the previous sections in this chapter, it should be
clear that in order to accurately include group passenger demand into the general seat
inventory control model, certain issues must first be addressed.
Logically, issues such as demand independence and the time frame over which
group demand is realized will need to be included before we can characterize the problem
mathematically. More importantly, we must define the general mathematical model we
choose to employ -- whether it is a leg-based approach or a full network math
programming formulation. Once an approach has been defined, we must address more
specific concerns such as nesting and the problem environment we choose to use in our
formulation. If a probabilistic environment is chosen, then a model for the distribution of
group passenger demand is necessary. The remainder of this thesis is concerned with
mathematically characterizing the distribution of group passenger demand and using the
model to enhance current seat inventory control models.
Chapter 3
Review of Past Research
The problem of allocating seats to different booking classes or inventories has
been studied and documented since the early 1970's. Once considered only by the large,
major carriers, computerized yield or "revenue" management systems are currently being
used even by smaller carriers that have recognized the incremental revenue potential from
various forms of seat inventory control.
The body of literature dedicated to the MLMC problem has concentrated on
mathematical programming formulations seeking a system-wide "optimal" solution to a
greatly restricted version of the real problem. These original formulations, though
theoretically correct for the specifically defined problem they assume, are often time
consuming to solve and can produce "sub-optimal" revenue impacts when implemented in
a real world environment. Thus, recent research has concentrated on developing methods
of modifying the original formulations to generate solutions which are adaptable to current
airline reservations systems. These modified solutions have been shown empirically to
outperform the solutions from the strictly defined, original formulations. The following is
a discussion of past and current research in the area of seat inventory control. We start
by discussing the classic, single leg, two class example and conclude with a discussion of
the more general multiple leg, multiple class problem, including various techniques to
resolve implementation issues.
One of the first approaches for controlling the number of seats allocated to lower
fare passenger demand was proposed by Kenneth Littlewood [1] of BOAC in 1972.
Littlewood recognizes that lower fare passengers tend to book earlier than higher revenue
passengers, and he motivates the seat allocation problem in terms of service standards.
He argues that if reservations were accepted on a strictly "first come, first served" basis,
then the earlier booking low fare passengers would, in fact, be getting a higher standard of
service than the later booking higher fare passengers. If in accepting a reservation for a
low fare passenger a subsequent reservation for a higher fare passenger must be rejected,
the airline loses money, which exacerbates the problem.
Recognizing that the stochastic nature of demand can be modeled as a probability
distribution, Littlewood suggests, for a two fare class example, that reservations be
accepted for lower revenue passengers (paying a mean revenue r) provided:
r > P*R (3.1)
where R is the revenue associated with a higher yield passenger, and P is the maximum
risk of losing a higher yield passenger, assuming that in accepting a lower fare reservation
for that seat, the airline will have to reject a later booking request from a higher yield
passenger. Thus, in order to maximize revenue for a given flight, reservations for lower
yield passengers should continue to be accepted until P is equal to the ratio of the mean
revenues from the lower and higher yield passengers. Littlewood suggests that this
procedure can be generalized to many fare classes but does not present any such
procedure in his paper.
Equivalent expressions were derived by Bhatia and Parekh [2] at TWA in 1973
and by Helmut Richter [3] at Lufthansa in 1982, though their approaches are quite
different. Using differentiation and transform analysis, Bhatia and Parekh develop a
formula which relates an integral of the distribution for higher fare class demand, f2(y), to
the ratio of the lower to the higher fare class revenues, F1/F2. The formula they develop
is
F1 -
2  f2(y)dy (3.2)
where C is the capacity of the aircraft and T is the optimal allocation for the lower fare
class passengers. The integral represents the probability that the higher fare class
demand will exceed its current allocation. Thus, the optimal allocation occurs when the
value of this integral is equal F1/F2.
Richter presents what he calls a differential revenue method, which examines the
impact on the total revenue of a flight if one more seat is offered to the lower revenue fare
class. When the differential revenue is equal to zero, we reach a condition of indifference,
and thus the optimal seat allocation is found. Richter also makes the important
observation that the optimal seat allocation itself is influenced only by the distribution of
the higher yield and not the lower yield passengers, though the low yield demand
distribution does influence the total expected revenue for that flight.
The extension of the optimal booking limit problem to more than two fare classes
is a non-trivial one. Interactions between multiple probability distributions make the
Littlewood result hard to extend to the general case of N fare classes. Approaches have
been proposed by Curry [4], Brumelle and McGill [5], and Wollmer [6]. Curry describes
the differences among the various methods, and provides a summary of his own method
using convolution integrals. Belobaba [7] is responsible for the EMSR heuristic of setting
booking limits in the general case, and these limits have been found to produce expected
revenues consistently within 0.5% of those obtained using the optimal limits under a
variety of circumstances.
Jorn Buhr [8] at Lufthansa provides an excellent introduction to the multi-leg seat
inventory control problem, for the single fare class case. In his paper he presents the 2-
leg, 3-airport (A,B,C) network we described in Chapter 2, and defines sales limits, SLAB,
SLBC, and SLAC, and revenue per passenger RAB, RBC, RAC, corresponding to the
respective segments. Using the probabilistic nature of demand, he defines the expected
residual revenue (E) on a flight segment as the probability of realizing additional
passenger demand multiplied by the revenue per passenger, or, for example,
EAC(x) = PAC(x) - RAC (for segment AC) (3.3)
where EAC(x) is mutually exclusive of [ EAB(y) + EBC(y) ]. He then presents the
optimality condition for his partition as
Min AEz = |EAC(x) - (EAB(y) + EBC(y))| (3.4)
Using successive adjustments of x and y depending on the sign of AEz, he finds the
optimal sales limits for each segment once a minimum value is found. Buhr presents a
description of an iterative technique to find the minimum AEz, and provides results from
case specific examples using actual flight data from Lufthansa.
He concludes by discussing the input requirements of his model, as well as issues
regarding sensitivity analysis. In this discussion, he suggests a technique for treating the
multiple class case. Flight segment sales limits are determined first, using the average
revenue values for all booking classes as initial input data. Once the O-D allocations are
determined for each segment, each is then broken down further by fare class. Buhr notes,
however, that the average revenue values will change for the new passenger mix problem
per O-D itinerary, due to interrelations in the first step.
Ken Wang [9] at Cathay Pacific discussed the problem of setting optimal seat
allocations based on O-D itineraries for a multi-class multi-leg environment. He
describes a four step model, which essentially outlines the fundamental seat inventory
control problem as it is approached even today. The third step of his model deals with the
actual seat allocation algorithm, once estimates for unconstrained demand levels are
determined using historical statistical data. Wang defines the expected revenue of each
O-D itinerary i as
E(Ri) = Z Pr(xjk sji ) - Yjk (3.5)
This expression is equivalent to Buhr's, only it is applied to individual O-D/fare class
combinations rather than to an entire flight segment. In the above expression, Yjk is the
revenue associated with the jth O-D itinerary for the kth fare class. The method of
allocation he describes is essentially a greedy algorithm which assigns the first seat of
the aircraft to the O-D/fare class combination with the highest E(Ri) value. Once that
seat is allocated, the expected revenue values are updated for the next seat, and the
process is repeated until all seats on the aircraft are allocated. Unfortunately this method
becomes computationally overwhelming when large networks with many O-D/fare class
combinations are used. Wang does not discuss the notion of nesting seat inventories
once his "optimal" allocations have been determined.
Glover, Glover, Lorenzo, and McMillan [10] discuss what they define as the
passenger mix problem, and present a method of solving the MLMC problem using a
minimum cost (maximum profit) network flow formulation with side constraints. Nodes of
the network represent the origin/destination points on the route structure, where a
physical location may be separated into two or more nodes to reflect different arrival and
departure times of actual flights. Forward arcs connecting the temporal location nodes
represent the number of passengers on a flight segment, and are constrained (using arc
capacities) by the authorized capacity of the aircraft assigned to that segment. Backward
or reverse arcs represent specific passenger itineraries, or PI's, and the capacity
constraints on these arcs are the demand levels of each corresponding PI.
Arc costs on the backward arcs represent the price of the ticket of that passenger
itinerary. Thus the maximum value of the objective function is achieved when the largest
flow is realized on the arcs with the highest priced PI's, subject to the demand and
capacity constraints imposed by the arc capacities described above. The authors describe
a network of 600 flights and 30,000 PI's, with up to five fare classes allowed for each PI,
for which their network flow formulation was applied at Frontier Airlines. Finally, they
discuss significant improvements in running times over a more traditional LP formulation
of the problem using 200,000 variables and 3,000 non-trivial constraints.
There are several difficulties with the authors' formulation of the problem, however.
Most importantly, the authors assume a deterministic demand environment, i.e. demand
levels used in the formulation are constant and are known with certainty. This
assumption alone makes the strict use of the presented model ineffective in a practical
application. Moreover, the solution of the network formulation gives seat allocations in
"discrete buckets", which do not allow the sharing of lower fare class inventories with
those allocated to the higher revenue fare classes. Glover et al. do not discuss the
possibility of nesting, which would eliminate this concern , but may produce varying
degrees of "sub-optimal" solutions depending on how they choose to nest the distinct
inventories.
Richard Wollmer [11] of the McDonnell Corporation presents what is essentially a
probabilistic linear programming formulation of the seat allocation or planning model
approach to the single leg, discrete inventory problem. Using the notion of probabilistic
demand, Wollmer's method begins by calculating the expected revenue associated with
allocating the first of the remaining seats of the aircraft to each individual fare class i. He
defines this quantity as Vi,
Vi = ri - [ 1 - Fi(O)] (3.6)
where ri is the revenue for fare class i, and Fi(x) is the cumulative probability distribution
of the forecasted demand for fare class i, evaluated at the xth seat. The first of the
remaining seats of the aircraft is allocated to the fare class with the highest Vi. We
increase the allocation of that fare class by one, and recalculate the Vi given that we have
decreased the demand of future bookings to come by one, or
Vi = Vi - ri- [ xi = si ] (3.7)
We then repeat the allocation procedure successively, each time increasing the allocation
of the fare class with the highest Vi by one, until all remaining authorized seats on the
aircraft have been allocated. Wollmer notes that this procedure can be applied not only to
an empty aircraft, but also to partially booked flights, where the allocation algorithm is
repeated for the number of unsold seats, rather than the full authorized capacity of the
aircraft. An interesting and important output of this algorithm is the sum of all the Ti's
found in the course of the allocations. The sum, which we denote as Z(n), where n is the
number of seats allocated using the algorithm, represents the total revenue expected for
that particular flight leg.
Wollmer extends his single leg planning model to the two-leg, multi-class case.
This transition is fairly straightforward; instead of ri he defines rii, r2i, for the revenues
associated with allocating seats to passengers on respective individual legs, and rl2i for
the revenues associated with through passengers using both legs. Again, he calculates a
series of (now double subscripted) Vii's, V2i's, and V12i's, and using the same "highest
contribution" technique to allocate all the remaining seats of the aircraft. This algorithm
extends cleanly to the general MLMC problem, though the number of combinations
becomes prohibitively large beyond even a few legs and a few fare classes.
Wollmer finishes his paper with a rigorous proof that the allocation produced by
the two leg seat allocation algorithm is optimal. One difficulty with his proof is the
operational definition of the word "optimal". The allocations produced by Wollmer's
algorithm are optimal only for discrete fare class buckets, and only if the remaining
capacities of the aircraft on both legs are equal. The algorithm assumes that we are
constrained, through our reservations system, to allocate seats exclusively to each fare
class/itinerary and forbid any further bookings in a fare class once the number of bookings
reaches its allocation limit. Under these conditions, Wollmer's allocations would indeed
be optimal. However, as we discussed in Chapter 2, the idea of refusing a reservation for
a full coach fare passenger even though a deeply discounted fare class remains open is
counter-intuitive to a revenue maximizing objective. The practice of fare class nesting,
with booking limits replacing booking allocations, provides a means of always accepting a
booking request for a higher revenue passenger, provided there are seats remaining on
the aircraft.
Wollmer acknowledges that nesting should take place, but his solution is simply to
allow any seat allocated to fare level j, to also be available to a fare level i, if ri > rj,
essentially creating booking limits based simply on the allocations derived by his
algorithm. This form of nesting, however, has been shown to be sub-optimal to other
forms of nesting. Thus his proof of optimality is valid for an environment in which fare
classes do not share inventories, regardless of revenue, though in practice there exist
methods which provide solutions with greater revenue potential.
Wollmer [12] employs the techniques presented in his first paper to formally
develop a mathematical programming formulation of the single leg seat allocation problem,
which he later extends to the general case of N legs. He then introduces a technique
which is the foundation for a general decision making type algorithm. Simply stated, the
algorithm optimally allocates the N remaining seats of the aircraft, and calculates the
value of Z(N) as defined earlier. He then repeats the allocation algorithm for N-1 seats,
and finds the difference F = Z(N) - Z(N-1). This quantity 7, represents the expected
revenue value of the next seat to be allocated. Wollmer argues, if ri <f for any fare class
i, then fare class i should be closed to further bookings. Put another way, we will accept a
booking request only if the value of the request exceeds the expected revenue value
associated with the next seat to be allocated.
Although it is not the intention of this thesis to discuss the means of nesting the
discrete seat allocations derived from the mathematical programming approaches to the
seat allocation problem, the reader is encouraged to read Williamson's thesis [13] on the
comparison of optimization techniques for origin-destination seat inventory control. In it,
she provides a comprehensive description of possible methods to improve solutions
which result from a strict mathematical programming approach (both deterministic and
probabilistic) to the problem, as well as methods of increasing potential revenues by
modifying the average fare class revenue inputs to leg based approaches such as
Belobaba's EMSR heuristic. Much work is currently being done in this research area, due
to the sizeable revenue implications.
One method of combining the optimal booking limits of a nested inventory approach
and the distinct fare class bucket results of an origin-destination math programming
formulation is presented by Renwick Curry [14]. In his paper, he outlines a hybrid
approach which borrows from both seat allocation methodologies. After a thorough
narrative on the differences between the two approaches and the real world constraints
posed by computer reservation systems, Curry introduces his new method, which is
formulated as a mathematical program:
maximize I Rk (Ak) (3.8)
subject to Ik E j Ak5 Ci (3.9)
The variable Rk is defined as the expected revenue from the ith fare class nest; similarly,
Ak is the allocation given to the ith fare class nest. A fare class nest is a collection of fare
classes, all from the same O-D pair, which are ordered hierarchically according to
revenue. Inventories within a fare class nest may be shared, but inventories between
different nests may not. The allocation of a fare class nest, Ak, is the booking limit
associated with the highest revenue booking class in the nest. Booking limits within each
fare class nest are determined simultaneously using the optimal booking limit equations
discussed by Brumelle and McGill, Curry, and Wollmer.
In essence, Curry's method exploits some of the shared inventory benefits
possible through CRS nesting, while determining separate, distinct nest allocations
through an O-D mathematical programming formulation which aims for a "network
optimal" rather than a "leg-based" optimal solution. The fact that the inventories between
individual O-D nests cannot be shared, however, makes the revenue impacts of Curry's
solution "sub-optimal", just like the discrete fare class inventories from any mathematical
programming formulation of the problem. Nevertheless, his approach does strive to
improve previous efforts, albeit theoretically. Curry concludes his discussion with several
special considerations in airline management which can be addressed with the fare class
nest approach. He mentions overlapping flights, point-of-sale control, and group
acceptance.
The methodologies for seat inventory control just reviewed do not explicitly derive
formulations to handle the problems associated with group booking control. Possible
extensions are mentioned, but an examination of the group booking process and how it
differs from that of individual passenger demand is noticeably absent from the recent
literature. We hope to address, at least in part, those issues most crucial to the inclusion
of group booking control into future generations of revenue management systems.
Chapter 4
The Stochastic Nature of Group Demand
4.1 The Group Booking Process
The actual booking process for group travel differs from that of individual
passengers in several important respects. We begin our analysis of group demand with a
description of a typical group booking scenario. It is provided to highlight some of the key
differences, though the steps described are by no means standard procedure for all
airlines. We include them simply to familiarize the reader with the differences between
the group and individual booking processes and to establish a group booking taxonomy to
which we will refer in later sections. Before continuing our description, we make a
distinction between the two primary types of group requests -- ad hoc and contract.
The more common of the two types of requests are ad hoc requests, which are
generally made for one specific group flying on a specific itinerary. Typically, travel agents
or tour operators will make an ad hoc request to an airline after receiving a request from a
third party, or they may request a group of seats on speculation, based on anticipated
demand. Since ad hoc group requests are made on the spot, accept/reject decisions are
required for the specific requested itinerary, using current data maintained by both the
seat inventory control and reservations systems. The second type of request is known as
a contract request. A contract is generally long term in nature, involving many groups
travelling on many dates. Usually there is some common element to the itineraries, such
as origin-destination pairs, and/or the days of the week. Typical contract requests are
made by cruise lines, the military, and tour wholesalers who book similar itineraries over
several weeks rather than individually. As we will discuss, if contract group demand is
consistent enough, it can be forecasted and subsequently included in seat inventory
control algorithms. The following is a description of a typical ad hoc group request,
though many of the elements discussed are applicable to contract groups as well.
An Ad Hoc Group Request
The first major difference between the group and individual booking processes is
the time frame over which they are received. Although the majority of individual
passenger demand in domestic O-D markets is generally not realized until some time
within the eight weeks preceding the day of departure, group requests are routinely
received as many as eight or nine months in advance, possibly more. Special events such
as college football bowl games, high school band competitions, and Mardi Gras can lead
to significant group demand well over a year in advance due in large part to speculation by
third party customers such as tour operators and travel agents.
Whereas individuals may not be willing, initially, to commit to a specific itinerary,
say thirteen months prior to departure, a tour operator who knows she can get a large
discount on a block of tickets may reserve seats in anticipation of selling the space, at
least partially, within a specified amount of time. Because the tour operator can offer
individual tickets at a discounted fare, there is now an incentive for the individual
passenger to reserve a ticket through the tour operator.
In order to receive a discounted fare on a block of seats, the tour operator or travel
agent who has established sufficient group, demand must go through the phase of the
group booking process known as negotiation. During negotiation, the tour operator
contacts the airline and requests a specified number of seats for a given itinerary, typically
asking for a quote on the lowest possible fare. The analyst at the airline checks the
availability of the specified itinerary, and she will usually quote as a base price, the ticket
price of the individual fare associated with the lowest open booking class large enough to
accommodate the size of the group requested. As an example, consider a group request
for twenty seats on a two leg flight. If the lowest open booking class on both legs is the
M-class, the analyst will quote, as a base group price, the M-class fare for an individual
passenger traveling on that two leg flight. If the tour operator accepts the fare, the
analyst would then book those seats on the flight(s) -- although acceptance by the tour
operator of the base quote is exceedingly rare. Far more common is negotiation between
the analyst and the tour operator, which ultimately results in a reduction of the base
quote.
The logic behind this reduction in the group fare is, at first, a typical example of
bulk pricing. The tour operator, in requesting a block of seats at once, is reducing the
uncertainty of passenger demand, which is worth something to the airline. The savings is
in some sense being passed on to the tour operator through the reduced fare. However,
there is a key difference between ordinary bulk pricing and the pricing of group requests.
In ordinary bulk pricing, we generally assume that the marginal cost of each additional unit
of goods is constant, or even decreasing due perhaps to some economies of scale. The
margin of profit per item is decreased by the reduction in price, but it is justified by the
guarantee of the large size of the purchase.
The marginal cost of each additional seat of a group request, however, is
characterized by a non-decreasing function rather than a non-increasing one. Since group
requests can ultimately displace passengers paying higher fares, each additional group
passenger may occupy a seat with a higher expected marginal revenue value than the
previous one. For example, in a request of size twenty, if the lowest open booking class
with 20 seats available is a deeply discounted Q-class, the average individual passenger
fare displaced by accepting the group cannot exceed the average Q-class fare. For a
request of size fifty, however, the lowest open, common booking class may be the full
coach Y-class. If the group is accepted, a group passenger may now displace a full fare Y-
class passenger, rather than a deeply discounted Q-class passenger. The average per
passenger group fare for the group of size fifty, then, should reflect the possibility of higher
fare passenger displacement, rather than a reduction in price over the group request of
size twenty.
After the negotiated price has been agreed upon, the analyst will typically book the
seats in the booking class with the average fare closest to the negotiated fare, unless
special provisions for group bookings exist in the reservations system. The tour operator
will then have a specified amount of time, typically a few weeks, to actually commit to the
seats, at which time a non-refundable deposit on each seat requested must be placed.
Some time prior to departure, the tour operator must actually purchase the requested
seats she still wants, for the ticket price agreed upon during the negotiation phase. Seats
not purchased are still charged the non- refundable deposit, and any unpurchased seats
are then returned to the inventory for individual passenger demand. Any cancellation by a
passenger holding a purchased group ticket may now be subject to the same penalties
associated with individual passenger bookings. Typically, specific cancellation penalties
and refundability restrictions are also determined during negotiation, and may vary
significantly among groups.
As mentioned above, this description of the group booking process is by no means
standard to the airline industry. In fact, there are likely to be as many variations in
procedure as there are airlines. The important points to keep in mind as we try to
characterize group demand are:
1) Group requests are often received as much as a year in advance.
2) Nominal deposits are all that is required to hold space until a
short time prior to departure.
3) The marginal cost of each additional seat of a group
request is non-decreasing.
4.2 Characterizing Group Demand
Our discussion in the previous section suggests that the nature of the group
booking process differs enough from that of the individual passenger to warrant separate
consideration when modeling passenger demand. Indeed, we feel that the differences are
significant enough to motivate an entirely separate model to characterize the distribution
of group demand. The problem therefore becomes how to quantify the parameters
associated with the group booking process in order to accurately model group passenger
demand.
Before continuing with our model development, it is important to clarify precisely
what we are trying to model when we discuss group passenger demand. Unless
otherwise stated, a group request is assumed to be "genuine", in that it reflects a request
made on behalf of an identified single group of passengers wishing to travel on a particular
origin-destination itinerary, and who are at least somewhat flexible as to changes in
departure times and perhaps even departure dates. The size of the group request can be
based on speculation of anticipated demand by a travel agent or tour operator, though it is
assumed that the same group does not make multiple requests on different carriers.
Thus, partial or entire cancellation of the group request is based on inaccurate speculation
on behalf of the travel agent or tour operator, and/or the cancellation behavior of the
individual passengers. We present our model in terms of group passenger demand for a
specific flight leg, though entirely equivalent analysis can be used to model group
passenger demand for a specific flight or flight itinerary. Ultimately, the choice of precisely
what group passenger demand segment we model depends on the specific application of
the results.
The process we are trying to characterize is by nature a stochastic one; therefore,
we begin the model building process by briefly discussing the major sources of variation
associated with group demand, and later we use these variables to derive a probability
distribution for the number of group passengers on a specific flight leg. The three major
sources of variation we have identified are: the number of group requests received, the
size of each individual group request, and the utilization rate, a measure of what fraction
of the original group passenger bookings will ultimately be used.
4.2.1 The Number of Group Requests
The first dimension of variability associated with our model for group demand is
the actual number of groups requests an airline receives for a given flight leg. This
number, which we define as n, is bounded from below by zero and is theoretically
unbounded from above. Since requests are countable and not fractional (we cannot
receive a half request), n is a discrete random variable, and the probability distribution for
n, pn(no), can be expressed as a probability mass function, with impulses of probability
corresponding to the likelihood of receiving any one of up to n group requests for a given
flight leg. A typical distribution for pn(no) is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Probability Mass Function pn(no)
Though theoretically unbounded from above, we recognize that the number of group
requests for a given flight leg will have some reasonable upper bound, which is likely to be
rather small (in the order of four or five) in most instances. We do not need to make any
assumptions regarding an underlying distribution for pn(no). Presently, it suffices to
assume that for an individual flight leg, the distribution of the number of group requests
can be estimated using historical data.
The distribution shown in Figure 4.1, for instance, suggests that the probability of
receiving two group requests on some flight, say Flight 1234, is approximately 25%, or
stated another way, historical data indicates 25% of the departures of Flight 1234
received two requests for group bookings. The distribution of pn(no) for flight 1234 may
be similar to that of another flight, say flight 78, and in fact it may be reasonable to group
flights with similar distributions of pn(no) to make our estimates more robust. The
tradeoffs involved with grouping flights are well known -- gains in an indicator's
robustness due to aggregation may translate to losses in the ability to infer trends on an
individual flight basis.
4.2.2 The Size of the Group Request
The second dimension of variability in the group booking process is the actual size
of each group request received. The tour operator or travel agent who requests a block of
seats will generally request a specified number of seats, which we define as the variable
s. Less frequently, the tour operator will quote a maximum ticket price she is willing to
pay for each seat in a block of seats, and will then ask for the greatest number of seats
she can reserve at that price. For our analysis, however, we consider the first case,
where the the actual size of the group request is the variable.
Like the variable n, the number of seats s in a group request is bounded from
below by zero, is theoretically unbounded from above, and can take only discrete values.
Unlike n, however, the practical upper bound on s is not often a small number less than
four or five. In fact, many airlines do not even consider a request for multiple seats a
"group" request unless the block size is greater than ten seats. Though no upper bound
exists on the theoretical demand for an individual flight leg, the number of passengers in a
group request cannot reasonably exceed the authorized capacity of the aircraft, as is
commonly done in a charter flight situation. Thus, the practical bounds on the size of a
group request virtually span the capacity of the aircraft -- for a wide body jet, this upper
bound can easily be in the order of 400 seats. Due to such a large number of possible
values for s, it seems impractical to maintain the complete probability mass function for
ps(so). In fact, with 400 possible values of s, we may falsely attribute differences in
consecutive values of s to a fundamental difference in group demand, when we may be
dealing only with small sample bias. There is, for example, more reason to believe the
portion of the PMF shown in Figure 4.2 is the result of small sample bias than an inherent
lack of demand for groups of size twenty.
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Figure 4.2: Portion of Probability Mass Function ps(so)
We are thus left with the objective of how to characterize the distribution of the
size of a single group request. We present arguments for two separate models, both of
which provide more tractable and more easily maintained distributions than complete
enumeration.
4.2.2.1 The Continuous Case
A well known means of approximating a probability mass function with an
impractical number of discrete points would be to use a continuous function to describe
the distribution of the possible values of s. One possible continuous approximation for the
PMF of s is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Continuous Approximation for ps(so)
To determine the probability that s will take on a specific discrete value, say S, we need
to evaluate the integral of the new PDF fs(so) over the interval [ S - 0.5, S + 0.5 ], or
S +0.5
P[ s= S ] = Is-.5 fs(so) dse (4.1)
There are several difficulties with the continuous approximation approach.
Computationally, the integral may be time consuming to evaluate, given no prior
assumptions on the distribution of s and the curve fitting methods used to determine the
function fs(so). Moreover, the resulting value may still be, at best, an approximation of an
approximation, with two degrees of unwanted uncertainty. To simplify the calculations
somewhat, we can start to make assumptions about the underlying distribution of group
demand, perhaps the normal distribution, which has well documented tables of integration
values. The obvious drawback of this approach is that we may or may not have the
empirical evidence necessary to support our assumptions. Of the two methods, however,
we feel the distribution assumption has the most promise.
4.2.2.2 The Discrete Case
The second approach to making the distribution of the size of a group request more
tractable is motivated by the idea of a histogram. Rather than making a continuous
approximation out of the discrete probability mass function ps(so), we instead make even
larger, discrete buckets of width w. Thus, instead of having C (where C = the capacity
of the aircraft) individual buckets of width 1, we have C/w buckets, each having width w.
Figure 4.4 shows a plausible PMF for s before and after aggregating the data into
probability "buckets". Note that the method just described addresses our earlier concern
that consecutive values of s may have misleadingly large differences in ps(so) due to
small sample bias. Under the new method, consecutive values of s will be placed, in
general, into a single probability bucket, and thus the aggregation of the individual values
into these buckets should provide a more robust model for the true distribution of the size
of a group request.
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Figure 4.4: "Probability Buckets" Approximation of ps(so)
In addition to being more robust, the probability bucket concept has a rather
attractive intuitive appeal from the perspective of the tour operator. If we assume that a
tour operator's request for a group of seats is based initially on a speculative estimate of
the number of seats she will be able to sell for a particular itinerary, then it is somewhat
more plausible to think of her request being in multiples of five or ten, rather than some
large prime number. Even if we relax the assumption that her request is made entirely on
speculation, it may be reasonable to assume that she will, in some sense, "round up" to
cover some unanticipated demand over the period of time between her request and the
day of departure.
Thus in the absence of strong empirical evidence to support the assumption of an
underlying distribution governing the size of an individual group request, we believe the
method of creating "probability buckets" provides an intuitive and easily tractable means
of characterizing the desired distribution of ps(so).
4.2.3 The Utilization Ratio Components
The third and perhaps most problematic dimension of variability when trying to
characterize group demand is known as the utilization ratio or utilization rate. Simply put,
the utilization ratio expresses the fraction of seats in the original group request that will
ultimately be used by that group. The idea of the utilization ratio is sometimes expressed
in terms of its complement, commonly known as the cancellation rate. For individual
passenger demand, the determination of a utilization rate is straightforward -- for a given
flight, simply divide the number of passengers who actually fly by the number of
reservations made for the same flight.
From our previous description of the group booking process, it is obvious that such
a singular calculation is not possible for a group booking. There are in fact three possible
instances where separate components of the total utilization ratio can be calculated. The
first occurs when the tour operator must commit the non-refundable deposit for each seat
she still wishes to reserve. As the analyst has already booked a specified number of
seats according to the original negotiation, seats no longer wanted by the tour operator
(those for which no deposit is made) can be returned to the flight's seat inventory, and can
again be used for additional group or individual passenger bookings. Nevertheless, the
unused seats have incurred an opportunity cost to the airline during the time they were
unavailable for further bookings. We will denote this cost as ci, and the fraction of
originally booked seats for which a deposit is placed as pl.
Once a deposit is placed for the desired seats, there is a second opportunity for the
tour operator or travel agent to renege on all or part of the booking agreement. The tour
operator has the option of purchasing only a fraction of the remaining booked seats, and
losing the non-refundable deposit on those returned. Again, the airline can return the
unpurchased seats to the seat inventory. However, the time frame over which the seats
can be resold has been significantly reduced, as the purchase deadline is typically quite
close to the departure date. Although they may and often do collect the non-refundable
deposits on the unpurchased seats, the opportunity costs associated with potential
spoilage (seats that depart empty when there exists demand for those seats) may far
outweigh the benefits gained by collecting those deposits. We denote the cost associated
with not having the seats available for further bookings to be c2, and the fraction of tickets
actually purchased by the tour operator as P2.
There is, in fact, a third utilization ratio associated with group travel which
expresses the fraction of the individual group passengers who actually use the tickets
they have purchased. In some sense, this rate is similar to the utilization rate of an
individual passenger (depending on restrictions), as the airline has already received
payment for the seat, and whether or not the passenger chooses to use the ticket is not
necessarily affected by the actions of other passengers in the group. There is, again, a
cost to the airline if the passenger does not use his ticket, albeit an opportunity cost. The
unused seats are generally not recognized until the day of departure, thus they cannot be
put back into the seat inventory for further bookings. We denote the cost of losing
potential further bookings as c3, and the fraction of purchased group tickets actually used
on the given flight(s) as p3.
Having separated the notion of utilization into three distinct components, we note
that for analysis we may wish to express just a single rate, which nevertheless
incorporates vital information associated with all three constituents. In order to
accomplish this aggregation, it is necessary to reflect the potentially high variation of such
a parameter. Thus, we choose to model the utilization ratio, u, as a random variable
rather than the more traditional characterization of a deterministic value. The distribution
for u can be expressed either as a continuous variable, with PDF fu(uo), taking on decimal
values between zero and one, or equivalently as a discrete variable with PMF pu(uo),
taking on nonnegative integer values between zero and one hundred. Examples of each
are shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. For the purposes of further analysis, we will use the
discrete representation.
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Figure 4.6: Discrete Representation of pu(uo)
4.3 Ranking the Costs Associated with the Utilization Ratio
In the previous section, we described the three potential costs associated with denying
further bookings due to reservations that are ultimately not used. Briefly, these costs are
incurred at the following times:
i) Time between negotiation phase and placement of non-
refundable deposit.
ii) Time between placement of non-refundable deposit and
actual purchase of tickets.
iii) Time between actual ticket purchase and day of departure.
Although ideally we would like to track all three of the utilization parameters
independently, data restrictions may prevent us from maintaining separate records, or
even allowing us to estimate one or more of the individual parameters. Thus, if we are
able to estimate only one or two of the parameters, or perhaps simply the aggregate, it
would be helpful to establish a hierarchy of the relative importance of the three
components -- a precedence list, in some sense. The list can then be used in assessing
how much effort should be placed in tracking each of the three components. After
discussing the three costs, ci, c2, and c3, we present what we believe is the proper
precedence list for ranking these costs.
Of the three, the cost associated with the first time period, ci, seems to be the
lowest to the airline. Consider the time during which this cost is incurred. In general,
group negotiations are performed several months in advance of the flight departure, and
the time between negotiation and placement of the non-refundable deposit typically does
not exceed more than a few weeks. Thus, in many cases, there are still months until the
day of departure when the seats are unavailable to further bookings. Since individual
passenger demand is largely realized within eight weeks prior to departure, the
opportunity cost of not selling the unused seat to an individual passenger can be
considered negligible. The unused seats, however, do impact further group bookings.
Since the base quote during the negotiation phase of another group depends upon the
ticket price of the lowest fare class large enough to accommodate the size of the group
request, superfluous bookings may drive up the base quote for the next group artificially.
This situation is detrimental to the airline only in the extreme case when the extra
bookings on hand are numerous enough to artificially close a booking class. Even in this
case, the final ticket price is still decided upon by an analyst, and the negotiated price may
be well below the ticket price of the higher open fare class.
In situations less extreme than the one described above, we can in fact discuss the
possibility of a slight benefit of extra bookings on hand during the first time period, in
terms of a potential "sell-up" effect. In the context of individual passengers, sell-up
occurs when the passenger's initial choice for a fare class is closed, and the next higher
fare class is sufficiently close in price that the passenger will purchase the higher priced
ticket rather than seeking a different flight or carrier. In the group context, recall that the
marginal cost of each additional seat is an increasing function. Thus a tour operator
negotiating for a group of size twenty on a flight with 50 bookings on hand is, in some
sense, trying to purchase more valuable seats than for a similar flight with no bookings on
hand. Provided the increase in marginal seat costs due to the extra bookings already on
hand is not excessive enough to drive the ticket price over the tour operator's negotiating
limit, the final negotiated price may indeed be slightly higher for the first case (with 50
bookings on hand), thus paralleling the notion of sell-up.
We believe the next smallest cost associated with the three utilization ratios is c3,
the cost during the period just prior to departure. As described in Section 4.2.3, c3 is
essentially the opportunity cost of a further booking (depending on restrictions), given
that a group traveler does not show up on the day of departure. The unused seat can be
sold to another passenger, group or individual, and thus the airline can receive another
ticket's worth of revenue for that flight.
By far the largest of the three costs is c2, the cost of the unused booking being out
of the seat inventory between the time of deposit placement and the actual purchase of
the desired seats. Though the notion of sell-up associated with ci still applies, the "ci"
seats are generally out of the seat inventory for only a few weeks, and those few weeks
are likely to take place months before individual passenger demand begins to materialize.
The seats associated with c2, on the other hand, may be out of the seat inventory for
several months, beyond the time when most group demand is realized. Thus any possible
benefits are quickly diminished by the opportunity costs of displacing individual
passengers, particularly during the time frame over which individual passenger demand is
realized. In addition to potential individual passenger displacement, unused bookings
during the second time frame may displace other group passengers as well, thus
compounding the opportunity cost we have described.
In summary, then, the relative ranking of the costs associated with the three
utilization ratios, from lowest to highest, is
ci < c3 << c2
As mentioned previously, the above expression can be used as an indicator of precedence
for determining the order in which estimates of the utilization ratio components should be
determined when modeling group demand.
4.4 Independence of Parameters
In the previous discussion, we characterized the three dimensions of variability
associated with group demand: the number of group requests, the size of any individual
request, and the corresponding utilization ratios. Before continuing with our mathematical
characterization, some assumptions must be made about the interrelationships between
these variables. Namely, our model assumes all three variables to be statistically
independent of each other.
4.4.1 Independence between N and S
At first, it might seem there is a rather strong relationship between the number of
group requests and the size of any individual request. Clearly, if we know that there are
twenty separate groups on an aircraft with a capacity of 100 seats, it is logical to infer that
the average group size is quite small. However, the distributions we are modeling are not
intended to characterize passengers flown but rather passenger demand, which is realized
far in advance of flight departure. The distribution of the number of group requests is not
in any way constrained by physical aircraft limitations; for example, the number of group
requests for a flight to Mardi Gras or the Rose Bowl may far exceed the number an airline
is able to carry. Similarly, the size of any one group is also theoretically unbounded. The
independence assumption of these variables follows from this unboundedness argument.
Why, for instance, would the fact that an airline received two group requests earlier in the
day impact the size of the next group request? Thus, for our model, we will assume that
the number of group requests and the size of any individual request are independent.
4.4.2 Independence between N and U
Using similar reasoning, we feel that the number of group requests for a particular
itinerary and the utilization ratio for an individual group request are also independent.
How many seats will be purchased and used from an initial request of 50 should not be
influenced by the number of other group requests received. Additionally, we assume that
passengers are not booked on multiple group requests.
4.4.3 Independence between S and U
Of the three interrelationships, the one for which dependence is most conceivable
is between the size of an individual request and the utilization ratio. We might believe,
for instance, that there is a greater chance of partial cancellation from a request of 200
seats than there is for one of only 20. The 200 seat request intuitively seems more of a
speculation. Obviously, it is not necessarily the case, and there are arguments to the
contrary as well. In order to resolve the question of possible dependence we make a
rationality assumption that the actual number of seats requested for a group may based
on some proportion of speculation (or systematic variation), but that this proportion is
uncorrelated to the request size. We do not claim the proportion of speculation itself is
constant, simply uncorrelated to the size of a group request. For example, the proportion
of speculation might be vary uniformly between 5 and 10 percent of the group request. For
a group of size 20, the number of speculated seats might therefore be between one and
two seats. For the group of size 200, the number of speculated seats might be between
ten and twenty. However, our rationality assumption claims there is no reason to believe
the true number of speculated seats in the group request of size 200 is closer to 20 than
the true number of speculated seats in the group of size twenty is to two. Having argued
the independence among all three components of group demand, we continue with its
mathematical characterization.
4.5 Modeling Group Demand
We can now formally develop our model for the distribution of group passengers on a
particular flight. We are given as inputs to our model the probability distributions for the
three primary variables associated with group demand:
i) pn(no), the number of group requests
ii) ps(so), the size of any individual request
iii) pu(uo), the utilization ratio for any individual request
As discussed in previous sections, these distributions can all be expressed as discrete
random variables with nonnegative integer experimental values, and we assume that all
three are statistically independent. To combine these variables into a single distribution,
we will use the techniques of discrete transform analysis and convolution.
Discrete Transforms of Probability Mass Functions
As a review [15], recall that if px(xo) is the PMIF of a discrete random variable
taking on only nonnegative integer experimental values, we can completely define its
discrete or z-transform, pl(z), as
pT(z) = E(zx) = zxo - px(xo) (4.2)
x.=0
Furthermore, it is possible to determine the individual terms of a PMF from px(z)
by the following formula,
* 0 a = zxo z= Ko = 0,1,2,... (4.3)
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Thus, we need only define the z-transform of a discrete random variable for its complete
probability mass function to be well- defined.
Finally, we state an important result when finding the sum of a random number of
independent, identically distributed random variables. We let n and x be independent
random variables, where n is described by the PMF pn(no) and x by the PDF fx(xo).
Define r to be the sum of n independent experimental values of random variable x. The s
transform for the PDF fr(ro) is fT(s) = pTfA(s)]. [X]. We lose no generality by making
random variable x discrete, and the distribution for x a PMF described by px(xo). The
result simply becomes a z-transform for the PMF pr(ro) ,
pT(z) = pT [ pT(z)] (4.4)
Using the chain rule for differentiation, we can obtain expressions for the expectation and
variance of r. These expressions are:
E(r) = E(n)E(x) (4.5)
a2 = E(n) - ±2 + [E(x)]2.a (4.6)
We proceed with our analysis first by defining a distribution for the number of
group passenger bookings for a flight, then later we add the notion of utilization to define
the distribution for the actual number of group passengers.
The Distribution of Genuine Group Requests for a Flight Leg
Under the assumption that the number of group requests and the size of any
individual request are statistically independent, the distribution for the number of group
requests for a given flight leg, which we define as r, can be thought of a random sum of n
group requests, where the size of any individual group request is itself a random variable,
s. Thus, from the discussion above, the transform of the PMF for r, pr(ro), is defined as:
pT(z) = pApT(z)] (4.7)
with expectation and variance
E(r) = E(n)E(s) (4.8)
2 = E(n) - a + [E(s)]2 .2 (4.9)
A completely well-defined PMF can be determined from the resulting transform as
discussed above.
We now add into our model the third dimension of variability, the utilization ratio,
to completely define the distribution for the number of group passengers on a given flight
leg. Recall that the number of seats ultimately used from our original, genuine group
requests is reduced by travel agent or tour operator speculation as well as individual
passenger cancellations.
The Distribution of Group Passengers for a Flight Leg
Adding the final dimension of variability into our model is simply one more random
sum of random variables, if we consider the utilization ratio to be an integer number
between zero and one hundred, as discussed previously. We define the number of group
passengers on a given flight to be G, with a PMF defined by pg(go). The discrete
transform for pg(go), Ps(z), is defined as:
p~g(z) = p3[pTz)] (4.10)
Using with expectation and variance defined appropriately as:
E(g) = E(u)E(r) (4.11)
a2 = E(u) -.2 + [E(r)]2 .ag (4.12)
where E(r) and Var(r) can be determined using equations 4.8 and 4.9 from above. Again,
the complete PMF for pg(go) is uniquely determined using equation 4.3.
In summary, we propose that the distribution for the number of group passengers
on a given flight leg, g, can be modeled as a random sum of random variables, each with
its own well-defined probability mass function. Using transform analysis, the expectation
and variance of g are easily determined, and the complete PMF pg(go) can be evaluated
using equation 4.3. Armed with a distribution for group passenger demand on a given
flight, we proceed in Chapter 5 by trying to incorporate our group demand model into the
traditional seat inventory control formulations discussed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 5
Group Seat Inventory Control
Implementation
5.0 Introduction
Motivated by the need for separate attention to group passenger demand in the
control of airline seat inventories, we present in this chapter explicit formulations of the
planning and decision making models introduced in Chapter 2 which include the control of
group passenger demand. Recall that planning models are typically formulated as
mathematical programs which seek to allocate seats to the optimal mix of passengers,
given future demand forecasts and average revenue values, and that decision making
models elicit accept/reject responses to individual requests given the number of bookings
on hand for the requested itinerary. We present both deterministic and probabilistic
formulations for the planning model approach to seat allocation, and our approach to
solving the decision making problem is presented in the form of the Displacement Cost
Model for ad hoc group requests. The Displacement Cost Model is motivated by the
expected marginal revenue approach of evaluating seat revenues first presented in
Section 2.4.2.
5.1 Mathematical Programming Approaches
To The Planning Problem
As previously discussed, the planning model approach to seat inventory control
uses mathematical programming to allocate seats to discrete buckets, based on
anticipated individual passenger demand. In extending these methods to include group
passengers, we introduce the notion of a group demand "bucket" or "inventory", for which
seats are actually allocated for anticipated group demand. Similar to individual passenger
inventories, the group bucket should somehow be nested into the entire fare class
hierarchy, though we do not discuss such issues here. We present the group demand
inventory to motivate the introduction of group demand modeling and forecasting into
current seat inventory control practice.
5.1.1 The Deterministic Environment
Recall that in the deterministic environment, individual passenger demand levels
for all fare classes are known with certainty well in advance of the flight departure. Thus,
the revenue contribution of each additional seat allocated to a particular fare class is the
average revenue value associated with that fare class, until the number of seats allocated
to that fare class reaches the forecasted demand. Seats allocated to a fare class in
excess of the demand forecast will have no revenue contribution as there is zero
probability of receiving requests above the forecasted number of bookings.
The objective function for a linear programming approach to solving the single leg
deterministic seat allocation problem can be modeled as a revenue maximization problem.
If we define xi to be the (integer) number of seats allocated to fare class i, then the
revenue contribution of all xi seats to the total revenue is Fixi , where Fi is the average
revenue associated with fare class i. To complete the objective function, we simply want
to maximize the sum of all Fixi for i = 1...k, where k is the number of fare classes, or
k
Maximize Fi - xi (5.1)
i= 1
There are, naturally, constraints to the objective function. In addition to the trivial non-
zero constraints, there exist demand constraints and capacity constraints. The demand
constraints place a limit on the number of seats we can allocate to any single fare class.
Intuitively, for a deterministic demand forecast of pi, the variable xi cannot exceed pi, or
xi s pi for i= 1, ... , k (5.2)
Similarly, the capacity constraints put a limit on the total number of seats we can
allocate -- these constraints are binding only when there is demand in excess of the
capacity, C. The capacity we consider may not necessarily be the physical capacity of the
aircraft. If we take into account no show behavior for overbooking purposes, then the
capacity we use as a constraint may actually exceed the aircraft's physical capacity. The
total number of seats an airline chooses to make available for a particular flight leg is
known as the authorized capacity. Conversely, if we are allocating seats only within a
subset of the coach cabin, we may wish to limit the sum of allocations to be some number
below the physical capacity of the aircraft. For an authorized capacity of C on the single
flight leg, the capacity constraint is simply
k
xi C (5.3)
i= 1
The complete single leg integer linear programming formulation for the deterministic
environment is thus,
k
Maximize Fi -xi
i=1
Subject to:
xi :! i for i = 1, .. ,k
k
xi C
xi 0 and integer for i = 1, ..., k
For the multiple leg case, we simply expand the decision variables to two
dimensions, where xi,O-D is the number of seats allocated to the ith fare class/O-D
combination The linear program can thus be written as:
k
Maximie I X Fi,O-D - Xi,O-D
O-D i= 1
Subject to:
xiO-D :5 KiO-D
k
Xi,O-D <5
O-D i= 1
for all O-D itineraries and i fare classes
Cj for all O-D itineraries and i fare classes on flightj,
for all flights j
xi,O-D 0 and integer
Including Group Demand
Under the assumptions of a deterministic environment, we expect to know, with
certainty, the group size and the per passenger group fare of each group request well in
advance of the flight departure. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the group
demand for our single flight leg comes from one request, with size pg and average fare Fg.
We define xg to be a binary variable taking the value of one if we accept the group request
and zero otherwise. The revenue contribution of an accepted group request is thus Fg g,
and zero for a rejected request. Our objective function can thus be rewritten as
k
Maximize Fi - xi + Fg - pg - xg (5.4)
i= 1
Since the group request is either accepted or rejected, there is no explicit
constraint on the demand level. There is, nevertheless, an implied demand constraint, in
that we cannot consider group requests larger than the authorized capacity of the aircraft.
The capacity constraints, however, still apply. If we accept the group request, then the
authorized capacity of the aircraft is in essence reduced by the size of the group, pg. We
then must optimally allocate the remaining seats to individual passenger demand. Our
expression for the capacity constraint thus becomes
k
Xi C -(pg - xg) (5.5)
i= 1
or
k
xi + (pg - xg) C (5.6)
i= 1
The complete integer linear programming formulation for a single flight leg in the
deterministic environment is thus:
k
Maximize Fi - xi + Fg - pg - xg
i= 1
Subject to
xi 5 gi for i = 1, .. ,k
k
Xi + (pg - xg) 5 C
i= 1
xi >0 and integer for i=1,...,k
xg=0 or 1
For the multiple flight leg case, we additionally define xg,O-D as a binary decision
variable for a group request on a specific O-D itinerary. The mathematical programming
formulation is entirely similar to the multiple leg case described previously, with the
objective function modified to include the revenue of the group request, and the capacity
constraints modified to reflect the reduction in capacity if the group request is accepted.
As discussed previously, the deterministic environment, though analytically
straightforward, does not realistically characterize the true nature of airline passenger
demand. To incorporate the uncertainty involved in passenger demand forecasts, we now
discuss the probabilistic formulation of the planning model approach to seat inventory
control.
5.1.2 The Probabilistic Environment
An accurate depiction of airline passenger demand should incorporate the uncertain
nature of forecasted demand levels - indeed, it is unreasonable to think that forecasts will
always be realized with certainty. To account for such uncertainty, the expected marginal
revenue approach, as described in Chapter 2, evaluates the probability of selling a seat if
it is allocated to a particular fare class, and determines the expected revenue contribution
of that seat by scaling the average revenue for that fare class by that probability. We
define EMRij to be the expected marginal revenue of the jth seat if it is allocated to the
ith fare class, and xi,j to be a binary variable taking the value one if the jth seat is
allocated to the ith fare class, and zero otherwise.
Consider the single flight leg case again. Since each of the C seats of the aircraft
can be allocated to any one of the k fare classes, there can be as many as k * C decision
variables xi,j each with a corresponding EMRi,j. The revenue maximizing objective
function then becomes
k C
Maximize 1 EMRij -xj (5.7)
i=1 j=1
In the probabilistic environment, the notion of strict demand constraints is not
appropriate, since there exists a non-zero probability of selling a very large number of
seats in any or all of the fare classes. There is an implicit demand constraint driven by the
aircraft capacity, as we cannot allocate more seats than are authorized. Thus, in
recognizing only k * C decision variables we do not deny the possibility of demand in
excess of capacity, we merely recognize that we cannot fulfill that demand given the
physical limitations of the aircraft.
To ensure that we do not exceed the authorized capacity with our allocations, we again
include a capacity constraint, which can be written as
k C
IIxi~j 5 C
i=1 j=1
(5.8)
The complete probabilistic linear program for the single leg case can be written formally as
k C
Maximize M~ ij - xi j
i=1 j=1
Subject to
k C
I xi,j C
i=1 j=1
xi,j=Ol
Again, we can generalize the probabilistic linear program to the multiple leg,
multiple fare class case by defining the binary decision variable xij,O-D, which receives a
value of one if the jth seat of the aircraft is allocated to the ith O-D/fare class combination,
and zero otherwise. We now discuss the addition of group demand into the probabilistic
environment. There are two cases which we will consider, deterministic group demand
and probabilistic group demand.
Including Deterministic Group Demand
Although we are under the assumptions of probabilistic individual passenger
demand, it is not unreasonable to imagine the negotiation of a group request which, if the
origin-destination and price (but not the specific itinerary) were already accepted, would
represent deterministic group demand. The decision as to whether or not to accept an
already negotiated group request for a specific flight leg is thus equivalent to allocating
deterministic group demand in a probabilistic individual passenger environment. The
accept/reject decision would be determined by comparing the total expected flight
revenues with and without the group. We can model such a situation with a probabilistic
linear program, including the deterministic group additions presented in Section 5.1.1.
More formally, the linear program for the single leg problem can be expressed as
k C
Maximize [FMRij - xi,j] + Fg - pg - xg
i=1 j=1
Subject to
(5.9)
k C
S xiJ + xg C
i=1 j=1
xij, x(g) = 0,1
The solution set includes a value for xg = 1 if the group should be accepted on the
specific flight leg and zero otherwise, along with the optimal allocation of individual
passenger demand over the remaining capacity. Similar analysis can be repeated for other
flight legs, if necessary. The difficulty of this approach is that many flight leg combinations
may have to be searched before finding a feasible group itinerary -- one for which xg = 1
for all flight legs.
Including Probabilistic Group Demand
Planning seat allocations for future group demand is not necessarily limited to
deterministic group requests. Ideally, we can foresee a revenue management system
which forecasts individual as well as group passenger demand based on historical booking
patterns and optimally allocates the seats of an aircraft to both types of demand. We
would thus introduce a group demand fare class, say G-class, where an availability for
group demand is explicitly calculated. Since per passenger group fares are typically lower
than individual passenger fares, the G-class allocation could be used to limit the number
of seats sold to travel agents and tour operators. Not all group fares are lower than every
individual passenger fare, and thus the G-class allocation could also be used to protect
seats for group passengers away from the deeply discounted individual passengers. Such
a system suggests that probabilistic group demand forecasts will be needed as inputs to
the optimization models.
In order to obtain probabilistic forecasts of group demand, we need a mathematical
model for the distribution of group passenger demand. Such a model is described in detail
in Chapter 4. Section 4.5 explicitly characterizes a mathematical derivation of the
distribution of group passenger demand, pg(go) and includes expressions for the
expectation and variance of the distribution, along with a completely defined formula for
obtaining the probability mass function itself.
With a completely defined probability mass function for the distribution of group
passenger demand, it is possible to evaluate the expected marginal revenue values
(EMR's) associated with allocating seats to a separate group demand fare class.
Provided with the average revenue paid by a group passenger on a flight segment, we can
calculate the EMRj,g (the expected marginal revenue of allocating seat j to the G-class)
by simply multiplying the average revenue per group passenger times the probability of
selling that seat to a group passenger. The probability that group demand will exceed the
jth seat is obtainable from the probability mass function pg(go). More specifically, it is
the complement of the cumulative mass function evaluated at the jth seat. or
P(gj) = 1 - Pg(j) (5.10)
where P(gj) is the probability of selling the jth seat to a group passenger, and Pg(j) is the
cumulative mass function of pg(go) evaluated at j. The expected marginal revenue of the
jth seat if allocated to the group demand fare class is thus
EMRj,g = P(gj) * Fg (5.11)
where Fg is the average fare of a group passenger on that segment. Thus, the treatment
of groups in the planning model is equivalent to a new fare class with average revenue Fg,
in the probabilistic environment.
The single leg, probabilistic linear program which includes group demand can thus be
written as
k,g C
Maximizr Y I EMRij - xij
i=1 j=1
Subject to (5.12)
C k,gI xij ! C
j=1 i=1
xij, xgj = 0,1
For the multiple leg, multiple fare class case, the probabilistic linear program can be
written
k,g q
Maximi2e E ERi,0-Dj - xi,0-Dj
O-D i =1 j =1 (5.13)
Subject to
Xi,O-D,j Ck
O-D i= 1 j= 1
for all O-D itineraries and i classes on flight k,
for all flights k
xi,O-Dj =0 or 1
From the solution set, we can determine how many seats should be allocated to
anticipated group demand by summing the non-zero xg,O-Dj's.
It is necessary again to emphasize that fares for group demand are almost always
negotiated. Thus, it may seem inappropriate to use a seat allocation of say, 20 seats,
which is calculated based on some mean revenue value, to determine whether or not to
accept a group request of size 30 with a per passenger group fare considerably higher than
the mean revenue. The purpose of the group fare class allocation is not necessarily to
prevent large groups from booking tickets on a particular flight. As discussed previously,
through the sharing or nesting of inventories, we can keep economically sound requests
from being rejected due to inadequate space in a single fare class. The group fare class
allocation can serve a dual purpose. For lower than average group fare requests, the G-
class allocation serves to limit the number of seats available to group demand, while for
higher than average requests, the G-class can serve as a guideline to protect a certain
number of seats from being sold to lower revenue individual passengers. This idea is
similar to the protection levels used for higher individual passenger fare class inventories.
Control of group passenger demand does not necessarily require the forecasting of
future demand based on historical data. Indeed, not all group passenger demand can be
anticipated. For individual passengers, unanticipated demand is controlled by updating
passenger demand forecasts and possibly redistributing seat allocations for the remaining
capacity of the aircraft. For unanticipated group demand, there is increased flexibility in
the absence of a fixed fare structure, and thus through negotiation of the group fare, the
airline can make accept/reject decisions for each individual group request in the absence of
a group demand fare class. Effective negotiation is aided by an analytic means of
determining the costs and benefits of accepting a group request for any given fare. The
Displacement Cost Model presented in the following section provides analytic support for
the negotiation of ad hoc group requests, single requests made by groups, generally for a
given origin-destination itinerary and departure date.
5.2 The Displacement Cost Model for Ad Hoc Group
Requests
In the previous section, we detailed mathematical programming formulations of the
planning model approach to the single and multiple leg, multiple class seat inventory
control problems, including explicit consideration of the control of forecasted group demand
through a separate "G-class" inventory. Future group demand, can be modeled as either
deterministic or probabilistic. In the case of probabilistic demand, historical data
regarding the likelihood of receiving requests (along with the request size and utilization
ratios) can be maintained and used in much the same manner individual passenger data is
used to forecast future passenger demand.
On the other hand, in the absence of an explicit group demand fare class for which
future demand levels are forecasted, an airline can still make accept/reject decisions for
group requests based on the future demand forecasts of individual passenger demand.
We now present strategies for using the decision making model, which can be
implemented in real-time for ad hoc group requests.
Our approach to solving the decision making problem for an ad hoc request is
based on a displacement cost model. In accepting a group request, an airline potentially
displaces up to S (where S = the size of the group request) individual passengers on each
flight leg the group travels. Since group fares are often discounted below individual
passenger fares in the same booking class, the decision of whether or not to accept a
group request is directly dependent on the anticipated individual passenger demand for
each flight leg in the group's itinerary. The group request should be accepted as long as
the revenue generated from the group is greater than the expected revenue of the
individual passengers the group displaces. Since ad hoc group requests are typically
subject to price negotiation rather than a decision based upon a single fare quote, the
output of our displacement cost model will be a minimum acceptable group fare for the
given itinerary. This minimum group fare represents the indifference point for the airline
between accepting the group and rejecting the group in favor of anticipated individual
passenger demand [16]. In equation form, the minimum group fare can be thought of as
Total Expected Revenueof Displaced PassengersMinimum Group Fare = Group Request Size
Determining the total expected revenue of the displaced individual passengers can
be accomplished using a variety of methods. In general, however, we recognize that
individual passenger displacement costs can be thought of in two ways: in a leg-based
scenario, and a network-based, (multiple-leg) scenario. Section 5.2.1 illustrates the leg-
based approach to solving the displacement cost problem using the expected marginal
revenue approach, while Section 5.2.2 describes how traditional MLMC seat inventory
control formulations such as the planning models discussed in Section 5.1 can be
employed as a decision making tool.
5.2.1 The Leg-Based Displacement Cost Model
The leg-based displacement cost model is based upon the expected marginal
revenue approach described in Section 2.4.2. Recall that, due to the uncertain nature of
passenger demand, forecasts are often characterized by an expected value and some
measure of the variation of the demand. In allocating a seat to a particular booking class,
we are not guaranteed to receive the revenue associated with that booking class for that
seat, and, in fact, the more the number of seats allocated exceeds the forecast, the less
likely we are to receive that revenue. Thus the expected marginal revenue function for
allocating seats to a fare class is a non-increasing function. Even in a fully nested
environment where seat inventories among the different fare classes are shared to
increase flight revenues, insufficient passenger demand may elicit infinitesimally small
expected revenues for the last seats on an aircraft.
For each leg on which the group will travel, our displacement cost model explicitly
calculates the expected marginal revenues associated with each seat of the aircraft, based
on the individual passenger demand forecasts and the specific fare structures associated
with each flight leg. Since group requests are typically made several months in advance of
the actual flight departure, we will assume that passenger demand forecasts can be
adjusted, if necessary, to reflect seasonal variation in demand levels. Also, since group
requests are typically made for the lowest possible fare, we assume in our model that the
group will be booked into the seats of the aircraft having the lowest expected marginal
revenues, filling the remaining seats in a "bottom up" fashion. Thus for a request of size
20, the total individual passenger displacement cost is the sum of the 20 lowest expected
marginal revenues of the remaining available seats on the aircraft. This calculation is
repeated for each leg of the group request, and the sum of the displacement costs for all
legs represents the total expected revenue of displaced individual passengers. The
minimum group fare the airline can charge without losing revenue follows directly from this
calculation.
A Simple Numerical Example
Consider the following 2-leg example for a one-way group request of size 15. The
individual passenger demand forecasts and the fare structures for each leg are given in
Table 5.1. The aircraft assigned to both flight legs has a capacity of 100 seats and we
assume that there are no bookings on hand at the time the request is made. We also
assume that the demand forecasts shown reflect seasonal demand for the departure dates
requested.
Table 5.2 shows the approximate expected marginal revenues associated with the
last 15 seats of the aircraft calculated using Belobaba's EMSR heuristic, along with the
calculations necessary to determine the minimum group fare for the specific request. The
minimum group fare of $190.31 per group passenger reflects an expected total
displacement of $2,854.66 in individual passenger revenues in accepting the group request
on both legs.
As the name implies, the leg-based displacement cost model does not directly take
into account the "network effects" discussed in the overview of the general MLMC seat
inventory control problem. Clearly, an estimate of the true optimal minimum group fare
based on individual passenger revenue displacement requires specific forecasts for
individual passenger traffic on the origin-destination itinerary the group will travel, though
such data are often unavailable or inaccurate. To partially account for such "network
effects", we can modify the assumed revenue values of the different inventories on
individual flight legs in order to reflect the specific O-D/itinerary composition of each fare
class revenue, similar to what is done by some leg-based seat inventory control models.
Nevertheless, the concepts behind the leg-based displacement cost model remain the
same.
Table 5.1: Displacement Cost Model Setup
Leg Fare Demand Demand Mean
Class Mean Stdev Fare
Y 36 10 180
B 25 6 140
M 16 5 115
Q 42 13 86
Leg 2 Fare Demand Demand Mean
Class Mean Stdev Fare
Y 14 5 380
B 12 4 320
M 35 10 270
Q 22 6 220
Table 5.2: Displacement Cost Model Results
Seat # EMR1 EMR2 TOTAL
86 $85.26 $135.00 $220.26
87 $85.10 $130.94 $216.04
88 $84.59 $128.41 $213.00
89 $84.66 $124.56 $209.22
90 $84.37 $124.24 $208.61
91 $84.04 $113.60 $197.97
92 $83.66 $110.00 $193.66
93 $83.46 $104.22 $187.68
94 $83.21 $103.16 $186.37
95 $82.83 $98.74 $181.57
96 $82.69 $95.44 $178.13
97 $82.10 $93.04 $175.14
98 $81.43 $83.31 $164.74
99 $80.67 $81.28 $161.95
100 $79.81 $80.51 $160.32
Total Displaced Revenue = $2,854.66
Min Group Fare = $190.31 /pax
5.2.2 A Network Based Displacement Cost Model
As mentioned in the previous section, the (true) optimal solution to the minimum
group fare problem for an ad hoc group request must take into account the impacts of
multiple O-D/fare class itineraries on each flight leg the group travels. Our leg-based
approach can only approximate such influences through a modification of the assumed
revenue values of leg-based inventories. A somewhat more appropriate method is
motivated by the planning models formulated in section 5.1.
Recall that one set of constraints in both mathematical programming formulations
of the MLMC problem requires that the sum of all allocations to the multiple fare classes
on each flight leg does not exceed the capacity of the corresponding aircraft. Also, recall
that the value of the objective function in the optimal solution represents the maximum
expected revenue over the entire route network under consideration. Let us define Z(C)
to be the optimal objective value of the linear programming formulation using the initial set
of aircraft capacities, C. Now consider an ad hoc group request of size S. We define Z(C-
S) to be the optimal objective value of the same linear programming formulation, where
the capacity constraints on each aircraft the group will travel is decreased by the size of
the request S.
The value of Z(C-S) represents the "best" solution to the problem given that we
have accepted the group request and the S seats they requested are no longer available to
further individual passenger bookings. We define the difference between the two
objective values Z(C) and Z(C-S) to be D(S). D(S) represents the opportunity cost of
accepting the group request in terms of expected individual passenger revenues. In other
words, D(S) represents the total expected revenue of displaced individual passengers
over the entire network. In algorithmic form, the planning model approach to solving the
minimum group fare problem for an ad hoc group of size S over an entire network involves
the following steps:
Step 1: Find Z(C) using the appropriate mathematical programming
formulation for the given network.
Step 2: Reformulate the mathematical program to find Z(C-S),
where the capacity constraints used in Step 1 are
decreased by S on each flight the group will travel.
Step 3: Find D(S) = Z(C) - Z(C-S).
Step 4: Minimum Group Fare = D(S) / S.
Note that our algorithm is completely general in that it does not make any
assumptions regarding the actual mathematical programming formulation used to calculate
Z(C) and Z(C-S).
5.3 The N-Split Minimum Group Fare Model
Thus far in our discussion of the minimum group fare problem, we have made the
implicit assumption that the group request was somehow indivisible, such that the entire
group must fly on the same itinerary. If, however, we relax this assumption and allow the
same group request to be split up and carried over different itineraries, we may in theory
achieve an even lower minimum group fare for the same ad hoc request, or alternatively, a
lower displacement cost at the same fare, translating to a greater profit for the airline.
The relaxation of the indivisible request assumption is quite reasonable given the
large hub and spoke route networks operated by most of today's major carriers. It is not
uncommon, for instance, for an airline to be able to service a specific origin-destination
pair with connecting flights through more than one hub, while offering virtually the same
departure and arrival times. Thus, an airline can better utilize excess capacity over more
flight legs simply by dividing the group in such a way as to displace the minimum expected
revenue from individual passengers, jointly over multiple itineraries, rather than just one.
The problem of finding the optimal division of the group request is in theory, no
more difficult than the minimum group fare problem for a specific itinerary, only now we
must specify a set of acceptable alternatives to the initial request. Acceptable
alternatives, for example, may be those itineraries having departure and/or arrival times
within some designated time window of the initial request. Once the set of alternatives
has been specified, we must then decide upon the maximum number of different itineraries
our group request will be allowed to travel. Note that this is not a rigid constraint, and in
fact, the true upper bound is the number of acceptable alternatives; however, a large
number of selections becomes cumbersome in practice.
We will continue to discuss the actual algorithm in terms of the leg-based model,
for simplicity, though entirely equivalent procedures can be performed for the network
model as well. In the leg-based formulation, the minimum group fare for a request of size
can be found from a set of A alternatives split over n different itineraries by creating ni
itinerary n-tuplets. The expected marginal revenues associated with the last S seats of
each itinerary in an n-tuplet are pooled, and our minimum group fare algorithm is applied to
the pooled set of expected marginal revenue values in exactly the same manner. We fill
the group request from the bottom to the top of our pooled set of revenues, keeping track
of which itinerary provided the minimum displaced revenue at each iteration, until the
number of seats allocated to the group request reaches S. The n-split follows directly
from the allocations.
Thus the displacement cost model for ad hoc group requests is not only limited to
finding the minimum group fare for a given itinerary, but it can also be used to find the
theoretically lowest possible fare if the group is willing to be divided over multiple
itineraries. From a competitive perspective, an airline using the n-split displacement cost
model can better utilize excess capacity, while simultaneously offering a variety of pricing
alternatives for all ad hoc group requests. Ultimately, better utilization of resources
lowers unit operating costs and provides incremental revenue on a larger scale.
Striving for a better utilization of resources is by no means a new concept to the
airline industry. One of the most common and well-accepted means of attempting to
maximize the utilization of fixed resources in the form of a scheduled flight departure is
overbooking. The final section of this chapter discusses the implementation issues
involved with incorporating the notion of group request utilization ratios into the general
methodologies of passenger overbooking.
5.4 Overbooking in the Group Passenger Context
Just as the concepts of utilization ratios and sell-up can be modified to fit the
framework of group demand as described in Chapter 4, so can the ideas and
methodologies of passenger overbooking. In the case of individual passengers, the
privileges associated with fully-refundable tickets allow a traveler to make multiple
reservations for a single trip, and not pay a penalty for reservations which go unused. By
consistently and accurately estimating the proportion of bookings which ultimately are not
used, an airline can book more seats than the physical capacity of the aircraft in order to
depart with as few empty seats as possible, without denying boarding to an economically
unsound number of passengers.
The amount by which an airline "overbooks" naturally depends on the estimate of
the attrition rate of reservations. Prior to the day of departure, a confirmed reservation
can be made and later cancelled, at which time the airline can still increase the availability
of the seat inventory for the affected flight(s). The probability that a confirmed
reservation will be cancelled prior to flight departure is known as the cancellation rate.
The complement of the cancellation rate is often referred to as the utilization rate, which
we discuss in detail in Chapter 2. In the weeks prior to departure, an airline can overbook
a flight by taking into account the cancellation rate.
Passengers holding reservations for fully-refundable tickets, as we have discussed
above, do not necessarily cancel unwanted reservations prior to flight departure and do
not incur a penalty. Thus, airlines must account for so-called "no-shows" through
overbooking in order to achieve maximum revenue potential. However, an overly
aggressive overbooking policy or inaccurate estimates of no-show rates can lead to more
passengers than available physical capacity at the time of departure. Such a situation
leads to passengers being denied boarding on a flight. The costs of denying boarding to
many passengers may exceed the incremental revenues associated with an aggressive
overbooking policy, and should be considered before implementation.
A rather simplistic expression used for calculating the proportion above physical
capacity a flight can profitably be overbooked is
Overbooking Factor = 11 - NS
where NS is the average no-show rate for individual passengers and the overbooking
factor is a scalar which, when multiplied by the physical capacity of the aircraft, gives the
authorized number of seats which may be reserved on that flight. More complex
expressions take into account the stochastic nature of the no-show rate and the costs
associated with denied boardings, but the underlying principles are similar.
When dealing with group requests, however, such a singular calculation is not
practical when trying to develop an analytic means of overbooking. In Chapter 2, we
describe three distinct components to the utilization ratio associated with the group
booking process, each with a corresponding cost. The third utilization rate, u3, is most
closely analogous to the notion of a no-show rate, where each individual passenger of a
group has a specific probability of using his purchased ticket. There is another "no-show"
rate that we have not yet discussed, which can be thought of as a "no-show" rate for the
group request as a whole. Recall that many months prior to departure, group requests can
be booked and returned with little or no penalty. Thus, a large number of group bookings
are made based on speculation, with a large degree of uncertainty. The initial opportunity
cost to the airline of a single cancelled group booking is relatively small, but many such
cancellations can have a serious negative impact on potential revenues, particularly if
authorized capacities are based solely on the no-show behavior of individual passenger
demand.
Ideally, we would like to be able to overbook a flight during the months prior to
departure to reflect the number of groups that are likely to cancel their requests outright,
in order to better accommodate genuine group passenger demand. Let us define the
probability of a group request being canceled in its entirety prior to flight departure as pi.
To determine the amount by which we should overbook the entire aircraft, let us separate
the physical capacity of the aircraft into an "individual passenger" capacity and a "group
passenger" capacity. This separation can be done using data based on the historical
portions each segment of demand has occupied on previous flights. Returning to our
simple overbooking expression, we might be tempted to overbook the "group passenger"
capacity using a simple substitution of pi for NS, the no-show rate for an individual
passenger. The danger in this substitution is the significant potential of denying
boardings to many passengers at once.
For example, say our estimate for pi is .25, or the probability of an initial group
request canceling outright is 25%. For an aircraft with a physical capacity of 360 and a
"group passenger" capacity of 120, the authorized capacity for group demand based on our
naive substitution of p1 for NS is 160. Assume that we accept two group requests of size
50, and one of size 60 (if a group shows up, all passengers will show up) based on the
authorization level calculated with our modified equation. From a purely expected value
sense, the long run average number of passengers who will show up for the flight is
.75*160, or 120. Assuming the three groups act independently, however, there is a (.75)3
= 14% or a 9 in 64 chance that all three groups will show up on the day of departure, for a
total of 160 passengers. This event translates to 40 extra group passengers than are
accounted for from a strictly expected value sense, and is likely to be quite costly in terms
of denied boarding costs. Thus, much greater attention to potential denied boarding risk is
required when trying to establish a policy for overbooking groups on the basis of the no-
show parameter, pi.
Returning to our earlier discussion of utilization ratios, it is clear that there is
another opportunity to increase potential revenues through overbooking. Given that our
group request will show up on the day of departure, there is still uncertainty associated
with the fraction of the initial block of requested seats that will be purchased and used. In
Chapter 2, we discussed the three separate components of the utilization rate associated
with a genuine group request. If we consider the aggregate of all three utilization rates as
the fraction of a genuine group request which will ultimately be used, then we can define
the complement of that fraction as P2, the fraction of a genuine group request which will
ultimately be returned to the seat inventory prior to the day of departure.
From our discussion of the group booking process, we recognize that the
uncertainty or variability of P2 is based, to a great extent, on the behavior of travel agents
and tour operators who request blocks of seats many months in advance based on the
speculation of fulfilling the request over the next few months. This uncertainty is in
contrast to the underlying distribution of individual passenger cancellation rates, which
are less likely to be motivated by such large degrees of future speculation. Due to the
large degree of uncertainty behind the distribution of P2, similar caution should be used in
substituting P2 for NS is our simple expression for calculating overbooking levels for
"group passenger" capacity.
The optimal overbooking policy for group passenger demand will naturally be
influenced by existing policies already being used for individual passengers. The above
discussion is intended merely to make readers aware that group passenger overbooking,
like seat inventory control, deserves separate attention. Similarities do exist, however,
to individual passenger methods, which make the possibilities of transfer and sharing
improvements to either method encouraging.
The techniques presented in this chapter outline enhancements for current seat
inventory control methodologies. Demand forecasting, seat allocation, and overbooking,
in one form or another, are all currently being employed by even small sized carriers. The
level of sophistication of these techniques depends on the available data as well as the
costs and benefits associated with improving current practice. If a large portion of a
carrier's total traffic can be attributed to group passenger demand, the enhancements
presented can serve to improve the management of that demand. If separate group
demand histories and even forecasts are currently maintained, the revenue improvements
associated with implementing the planning and decision making models we have
discussed could prove to be quite significant.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
The previous chapters of this thesis have discussed the general seat inventory
control problem faced by airlines. The emergence of large hub and spoke networks has
further complicated the problem due to the large number of potential origin-destination /
fare class combinations which must be controlled on a single flight leg. Most seat
inventory control mechanisms in use by airlines currently focus on making decisions
regarding the individual passenger, but neglect a rather important component of airline
passenger demand, namely group passenger demand. Group demand is prevalent in
markets where there exists a large proportion of leisure traffic, as well as in many
international markets. Decisions made regarding group requests require special attention
due to several major differences in pricing and booking procedures, which we have
detailed in Chapter 4. These differences include a flexible, negotiated price structure,
multiple utilization ratios, and a longer time frame prior to departure over which demand is
realized.
In order to consolidate individual and group passenger demand into a more general
seat inventory control methodology, it was necessary to characterize mathematically the
elements of variability unique to group passenger demand. These elements include the
number of group requests, the size of any individual request, and the utilization ratios
associated with each request. Armed with these elements, we developed a well-defined
model for the distribution of group demand which considers these primary sources of
variability inherent to the group booking process.
We then modified traditional seat inventory control techniques to include the
control of group passenger demand, without changing any of the underlying assumptions
made in the original models. These new formulations are presented in the first sections of
Chapter 5, and can be employed to control the seat inventories on future flight departures
based on forecasts for both individual and group passenger demand. Frequently, however,
unanticipated group demand arises and decisions as to whether or not to accept a request
or what fare to charge must be made on the spot. For these decisions, the individual
passenger Displacement Cost Model was developed to determine the expected revenue
of individual passenger demand displaced as a result of accepting a group request. The
minimum per passenger group fare an airline should charge follows directly from the
Displacement Cost Model. Issues such as overbooking groups and the opportunity costs
associated with inaccurate estimates of utilization rates are also discussed.
To be an effective revenue generating tool, any model for improving seat inventory
control procedures must be capable of being implemented. As our numerical examples
demonstrate, the practical application of the theoretical models we have presented can be
rather straightforward if the required data are available. Passenger demand forecasts and
average fare class revenues are maintained by even the most basic seat inventory control
systems, and are the primary pieces of information needed to implement the fundamental
displacement cost model for ad hoc group requests. Clearly though, the more
sophisticated the available data, the more effective the actual implementation will be. For
example, maintaining separate individual and group passenger demand forecasts makes
implementing any of the group seat inventory control methodologies much simpler.
6.2 Further Research Topics
The area of group seat inventory control is relatively new and rich in opportunities
for continued research. The two primary directions of such research are in group demand
modeling and improved seat allocation methodologies.
Group Passenger Demand Modeling
A primary assumption of the methods discussed in this thesis is that demand
forecasts for groups and individuals can be separated. Consider the Displacement Cost
Model for ad hoc group requests. We base the calculations for the minimum per
passenger group fare on the demand forecasts for individual passengers expected on each
flight. These demand forecasts may include, in some sense, the group request we are
negotiating if the forecasts are based on an aggregate booking history which does not
differentiate between individuals and groups. The total displacement cost of strictly
individual passenger demand may therefore be artificially high because our forecasts
already include the anticipation of some group demand.
Methods to filter out historical group demand from individual passenger forecasts
would undoubtedly make our model a more precise negotiating tool. Note, however, that
even if group demand is not currently filtered out, the model errs on the proper side from
the carrier's perspective. By suggesting a slightly higher rather than a lower minimum
fare, the analyst does not jeopardize a revenue maximization objective; rather, the model
simply suggests a higher pricing floor for each group request. Such a problem can be
remedied in the short term by simply educating analysts about how the model works.
The technique of characterizing group demand as a random sum of three random
variables used to develop our model for the distribution of group passenger demand is not
unique. Other models which incorporate other elements of variability can also be
explored. Indeed, an empirical validation of our model is itself worthy of future research.
Other approaches are certainly plausible, including an extensive examination of historical
group booking patterns to identify trends in the group booking process not captured by our
simple three variable model.
The notion of the multi-tiered utilization rate is another area which deserves
attention from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. Theoretically, extending the
ideas of non-refundable deposits and applying them to returned bookings in the earliest
stages of the booking process promises to reduce the variability of utilization rates. Tour
operators and travel agents who routinely book a single group on multiple carriers while
trying to find the lowest quote would be discouraged to continue such a practice if non-
refundable deposits were required many months prior to the date of departure. However,
the threat of losing long-term goodwill may make this practice undesirable from a practical
point of view. Instead, perhaps a policy of rewarding the travel agents and tour operators
with more reliable group requests (from a utilization perspective) would do more to
reduce the variability of utilization rates while maintaining, if not improving goodwill.
100
Improving Seat Inventory Control Techniques
Improvements to current seat inventory techniques are continually being
researched due to the large potential revenue impacts. As mentioned previously, much
research is being done in the area of O-D optimization, which directly accounts for
network-wide revenue contributions rather than simply leg-based considerations.
Certainly, improvements to individual passenger seat inventory control will directly
impact group control, and as we have seen, techniques can be shared between the two
methodologies with only minor adjustments. Empirical tests of various modified leg-
based methods versus network-wide formulations are being performed for individual
passengers, and an obvious extension of this research would be to explore the problem in
terms of group demand.
In Chapter 5 we discussed the N-Split Minimum Group Fare Model, which is an
extension of the leg-based Displacement Cost Model for determining the minimum per
passenger fare for a group request. The concept of searching for the least "expensive"
excess capacity over several fixed alternatives can be generalized to a complete network-
wide search to elicit the "optimal" split of any group request over an appropriate subset of
the route structure of an airline. A seat inventory control system capable of optimally
distributing group requests over unused capacity could have dramatic revenue impacts.
Moreover, the next logical step for such a system would be to distribute forecasted group
requests over the capacity with the lowest displacement costs (determined from an
expected marginal revenue perspective), thus managing seat inventories even more
effectively.
The idea of better excess capacity management through seat allocation motivates
the next step in the development of revenue management systems. Traditional seat
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allocation techniques are currently employed under the assumption of fixed capacity based
on the carrier's operating schedule. If we relax the fixed capacity assumption, we can
begin to approach the problem from both the scheduling and the revenue management
perspectives. A truly integrated system of scheduling and revenue management would
approach the true "optimal" solution for revenue maximization, though implementation
from an operations point of view might be prohibitively difficult.
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